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ABSTRACT 
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the creation of the federal Department of 
Homeland Security in 2002, many local agencies formed their own homeland security 
entity. Since that time, significant economic downturns have resulted in reductions in the 
amount of homeland security funding available to local jurisdictions. Another issue 
involves the lack of a common definition of homeland security and what it entails and 
how daily operations are conducted to forward the mission. A jurisdiction wishing to 
continue to support a homeland security entity needs to make sound decisions as it 
pertains to these issues in an effort to provide the greatest service to its communities.  
This thesis analyzed three homeland security organizational structures located 
within the Metro Atlanta, GA, area to find their advantages and disadvantages using a 
case study method. The analysis for these structures was based on the mission of each 
structure, as evaluated based on the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Report, or the 
mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or both if applicable, their 
operational functions as they pertain to the mission, and an inspection of each 
jurisdiction’s financial records relating to the overall department budget, homeland 
security budget, and grant monies.  
Advantages were noted for all structures along with recommendations that 
included the addition of mission-specific experts, the improvement of information 
sharing, jurisdictional relationships, cyber protection, and the proper development of a 
mission statement. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis examines three different types of homeland security organizational structures 
currently being used in the Metro Atlanta, GA, area and shows the advantages and 
disadvantages of each structure. The first structure is the law enforcement homeland 
security entity. This structure is based within a police department, with most personnel 
consisting of police officers and is mainly centered on the prevention and response to 
terrorism. The second structure is the emergency management homeland security entity. 
The emphasis is on prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery to both natural and 
man-made incidents. The personnel in this structure are primarily civilians with an 
emergency management background whose main concern is the development of plans. 
Law enforcement is used in this structure on an as-needed basis for their input and 
expertise. The third and final structure is the integrated law enforcement/emergency 
management homeland security entity. As the name suggests, this entity contains 
personnel from both the law enforcement and emergency management disciplines; 
however, they both work under the same leadership.  
To answer the research question “what are the advantages and disadvantages of 
different local homeland security organizational structures?” the following areas were 
analyzed: 
 The alignment of the organizational mission as compared to the federal 
mission for homeland security and emergency management. The federal 
mission for homeland security was based on the 2014 Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Report. The federal mission for emergency 
management was based on the mission of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA). 
 The operational characteristics of each structure to include the duties, 
responsibilities, and functions executed by each entity.  
 Budget concerns and their effects on continuing to fund homeland security 
initiatives on the local level and the amount of federal grant funding used 
in this regard.  
The method of this analysis revolves around case studies completed for each 
homeland security entity. Each case study looked at the mission of the entity, the 
operational duties of the entity and its budget as it pertains to the overall departmental 
 xvi
budget along with the monies allocated to homeland security and grant funding. As to the 
homeland security mission, the missions of each homeland security entity were compared 
with the core missions of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), which 
consist of 1) prevent terrorism and enhance security, 2) secure and manage this nation’s 
borders, 3) enforce and administer immigration laws, 4) safeguard and secure cyberspace, 
and 5) ensure resilience to disasters.1  
For jurisdictions with an emergency management entity, their mission was 
compared to the mission statement of the FEMA, which states, “Emergency Management 
protects communities by coordinating and integrating all activities necessary to build, 
sustain, and improve the capability to mitigate against, prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from threatened or actual natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other man-made 
disasters.”2 
Operations were studied for each homeland security entity through their written 
policy and procedure documents, as well as information obtained from leaders and 
managers. The day-to-day operations of the entity are important to ensure the operational 
characteristics are in alignment with the federal mission so funding can be received 
through federal grants. Grant guidance can play a factor in whether a jurisdiction receives 
federal funding for its homeland security entity.  
Lastly, the budgets for each homeland security entity were analyzed to ascertain 
the amount of money allocated to the overall departmental budget, the homeland security 
budget, and funds obtained from federal grants. The information was taken from 
available annual budget documents for the earliest year after 9/11 until the latest year 
available at the time of this analysis.  
After looking at each homeland security organizational structure, a number of 
recommendations were made that could benefit each entity. These recommendations 
                                                 
1 Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Report: A Strategic Framework 
for a Secure Homeland (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 76–79. 
2 Wayne Blanchard, Guide to Emergency Management and Related Terms, Definitions, Concepts, 
Acronyms, Organizations, Programs, Guidance, Executive Orders, and Legislation, A Tutorial on 
Emergency Management, Broadly Defined, Past and Present (Washington, DC: FEMA, 2008), 344. 
 xvii
include: 1) provide experts for all five missions of the QHSR as part of homeland 
security personnel, 2) improve information sharing, 3) acquire closer relationships 
between local, state, and federal authorities, 4) improve protection for cyber 
infrastructure, and 5) develop a mission statement.  
It is vitally important for each local jurisdiction to devise a homeland security 
structure that best fits its jurisdictions needs. The purpose of this thesis is to give local 
homeland security leaders and elected officials a better understanding of differing 
homeland security organizational structures so they can make an educated decision as to 
what may work best for their community.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002, many 
local jurisdictions enacted policy creating a homeland security entity. These jurisdictions 
have spent large amounts of money to support homeland security on the local level and 
comply with federal mandates.1 Since that time, the amount of homeland security funding 
available to local jurisdictions has been reduced, as well as a loss of revenue for many 
departments due to the downturn in the economy. A jurisdiction wishing to continue to 
support a homeland security entity needs to make sound decisions as to what type of 
organizational structure would provide the most benefit. This thesis offers a comparative 
analysis for three organizational structures to assist local jurisdictions in this decision. 
The three organizational structures discussed are a law enforcement homeland security 
entity, an emergency management homeland security entity, and an integrated law 
enforcement and emergency management homeland security entity. 
The first structure, a law enforcement homeland security entity, is under the 
control of law enforcement and is centered on terrorism and other local criminal matters. 
The second, an emergency management homeland security entity, is an emergency 
management entity dealing with all hazards, but instead of emergency managers and law 
enforcement working hand in hand with each other on a daily basis, law enforcement is 
used more often in working groups when needed for their expertise on certain projects. 
The third, an integrated law enforcement and emergency management homeland security 
entity, involves law enforcement and civilian emergency managers working together 
under the same leadership on a daily basis and planning for all possible contingencies.  
Local jurisdictions wishing to continue a homeland security program face several 
challenges that must be addressed for their programs to be successful. The challenges 
addressed in this thesis are the lack of a common definition for homeland security that 
                                                 
1 Kiki Caruson and Susan A. MacManus, “Mandates and Management Challenges in the Trenches: An 
Intergovernmental Perspective on Homeland Security,” Public Administration Review 66, no. 4 (2006): 
528. 
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can lead to mission confusion, funding considerations due to the downturn of the 
economy in recent years, and deciding if the focus of the homeland security entity should 
be on terrorism or concentrate on all hazards emergency management. The focus chosen 
will affect not only the operations that are executed by the entity, but also the 
organizational structure. Regardless of the concept chosen, the importance of proper 
communication between each discipline is vital. Intelligence information must also be 
properly disseminated between both disciplines so planning and mitigation can be 
conducted accurately.  
In the current realm of local homeland security, as on the federal level, mission 
confusion occurs because no common definition of homeland security has been proffered. 
Shawn Reece states that strategic documents and mission statements have varying 
missions developed from different homeland security definitions.2 According to Brian 
Gerber et al., in their 2005 article titled, “On the Front Line American Cities and the 
Challenge of Homeland Security Preparedness,” clearly articulated missions, goals, and 
strategies are critical to effective policy.3  
Most jurisdictions have an office of emergency management whose job is to 
prepare, mitigate, respond to, and recover from a variety of disasters, including terrorist 
attacks; therefore, could homeland security be integrated under the all-hazards 
comprehensive emergency management concept? Homeland security being absorbed 
under this auspice may relieve the challenges of mission confusion, cost/funding issues, 
and duplication of services regarding grant administration; however, it could also lead to 
other challenges. Since most emergency management positions are occupied by civilians, 
these challenges could be allowing the investigation of terrorism on the local level to 
diminish or be severely reduced, operational challenges, such as coordinating 
communication between emergency management and law enforcement personnel, and 
gaining intelligence necessary to manage terrorist threats properly. 
                                                 
2 Shawn Reese, Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations (CRS 
Report No. R42462) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 1. 
3 Brian J. Gerber et al., “On the Front Line American Cities and the Challenge of Homeland Security 
Preparedness,” Urban Affairs Review 41, no. 2 (2005): 185.  
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A clearly defined homeland security mission is important, but may be difficult to 
obtain due to the lack of a consistent definition of what constitutes homeland security. 
The mission and goals of a local jurisdiction could affect the eligibility for federal grants 
if it does not fall under what the federal government deems a homeland security function. 
The annual Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance requires urban areas to describe 
their homeland security objectives and goals along with other information in the grant 
application process.4 A clear mission would also help focus, direct, and prioritize 
homeland security activities.5  
Federal homeland security grants have offered both homeland security and 
emergency management funding for equipment, communications, and training; however, 
these benefits also caused challenges for local governments. Compliance with federal 
mandates is one of these challenges that affect both disciplines. As with other levels of 
government, the local level is experiencing budget constraints that make it difficult to 
comply with federal mandates. Heavy financial burdens are placed on local governments 
to meet these standards. These mandates also cause an increase in administrative duties 
used to oversee the implementation and policy changes needed to conform to the 
mandates set forth.6  
Federal mandates are placed on local governments through legislation to be 
eligible to receive grant funding. The objective of these mandates is to standardize and 
encourage preparedness at the local level and to improve intergovernmental coordination. 
The goal of the National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS), and the National Preparedness Goal, are to assist with this standardization.7  
The financial challenges to local governments through the federal mandates along 
with other budget constraints may cause some jurisdictions to consider the elimination of 
an independent homeland security entity. The expenses associated with an independent 
                                                 
4 Shawn Reese, Homeland Security Grants: Evolution of Program Guidance and Grant Allocation 
Methods (Order Code RL33583) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), CRS-2. 
5 Reese, Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations, 2. 
6 Caruson and MacManus, “Mandates and Management Challenges in the Trenches,” 528. 
7 Ibid., 524. 
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entity could entail the cost of maintaining office equipment, the expense of budgeting for 
separate personnel and administrative tasks, and the possibility of duplication of services 
between the two disciplines.  
Intelligence is an important factor in both homeland security and emergency 
management. Some personnel in both disciplines may have access to intelligence 
information and others may not. For each jurisdiction, the question of who has clearance 
within homeland security and emergency management regarding classified and For 
Official Use Only (FOUO) documents was explored. Intelligence information including 
the vulnerabilities and any potential targets within the jurisdiction is important to 
understand when producing mitigation plans. Without this information, planning would 
suffer because the focus could be on the wrong targets, and also, not knowing the 
vulnerabilities of the targets makes mitigation difficult. How intelligence information is 
received and shared within the organizational structure, as well as how it is shared with 
outside jurisdictions, was analyzed.  
Communication is important between emergency managers and homeland 
security. During an emergency event, communication can be enhanced through the 
emergency operations center (EOC). All disciplines are in one room and are receiving the 
same information; however, keeping this line of communication open is also important 
during every day operations. Planning for all types of scenarios from natural and man-
made disasters to terrorism requires an information flow between these two disciplines. 
William Waugh, a professor of public affairs at Georgia State University, stated, 
“Collaboration is a necessary foundation for dealing with both natural and technological 
hazards and disasters and the consequences of terrorism.”8 Communication was 
examined in the three organizational structures to determine the strengths and weaknesses 
of each structure. 
These challenges faced by local governments could possibly be rectified to some 
extent by maintaining an all-hazards emergency management approach without the need 
for a separate homeland security entity. Also, due to the budgetary limits, it is important 
                                                 
8 William L. Waugh and Gregory Streib, “Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency 
Management,” Public Administration Review 66, no. s1 (2006): 131.  
 5
to ascertain how local governments can continue to meet the obligation of protecting its 
citizens from all hazards without unnecessarily increasing spending or expanding 
government. Increased spending and expansion of government occurred when homeland 
security was implemented on the local level,9 and it may not be sustainable.  
The question may be asked, “If homeland security was eliminated on a local level, 
could emergency management take on its role?” This concept is a possibility; however, 
associated challenges occur as well, such as having access to the same information 
requiring the same security clearance law enforcement has. Without this clearance, 
investigating and gathering intelligence on terrorist groups that may pose a threat would 
be difficult to obtain. Emergency managers need to be provided appropriate security 
clearances to have the information needed to prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover 
from terrorist events. Two years after September 11, 2001 (9/11), only half the state and 
local offices of emergency management (OEM) received guidance from the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) concerning the types of information regarding terrorism 
activity.10 Also, only six percent local OEMs applied for security clearances after 9/11.11 
Law enforcement and emergency management must also have a close working 
relationship for this model to be a success.  
After 9/11, the question of “Do we need a department of homeland security?” 
became a controversy. The Bush administration did not want to create the department, 
but bowed to political pressure.12 Thomas Birkland of North Carolina State University 
stated, “From an emergency management perspective, there was little about the 
September 11 attacks that suggested major problems with emergency management in the 
United States that would require the inclusion of FEMA into DHS.”13 These statements 
                                                 
9 Donald F. Kettl, “Contingent Coordination Practical and Theoretical Puzzles for Homeland 
Security,” The American Review of Public Administration 33, no. 3 (2003): 253–277.  
10 Lois M. Davis et al., Combating Terrorism: How Prepared Are State and Local Response 
Organizations? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 11.  
11 Ibid., 12, Table 2.2. 
12 Thomas A. Birkland, “Disasters, Catastrophes, and Policy Failure in the Homeland Security Era,” 
Review of Policy Research 26, no. 4 (2009): 424.  
13 Ibid. 
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questioned the need for a homeland security entity at the federal level, but could also 
have meaning on the local level. This thesis directly addressed homeland security issues 
for local jurisdictions. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question posed for this thesis is, “Homeland Security: What are the 
advantages and disadvantages of different local homeland security organizational 
structures?” It is important to look at all three structures and determine what makes the 
most sense based on the mission of the jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions may want to focus 
on terrorism, whereas others may want a more all-hazards approach. Funding as it 
pertains to the operating budget and grant monies awarded could also influence the 
structure utilized. Each structure possesses advantages and disadvantages that could 
affect the direction the jurisdiction decides to take; therefore, it is important to realize 
these benefits and detriments.  
C. METHOD 
A case study of each organization type was conducted to answer the research 
question. The Metro Atlanta region was chosen for the cases because of the commonality 
of natural disaster and man-made threats, as well as having jurisdictions that represent 
each of the structures to be analyzed. The importance of this study is that it allows 
jurisdictions in the Metro Atlanta area to choose which structure would best benefit them 
from a mission and budgetary standpoint.  
The case studies focus on the mission of homeland security and emergency 
management on the local level. This study looked at the following issues to assist 
jurisdictions in finding the best solution on how to conduct homeland security on the 
local level. 
 The alignment of the organizational mission versus the federal mission for 
homeland security and emergency management. The more closely aligned 
the mission statement and the listed responsibilities are to the federal 
mission will determine if the jurisdiction is eligible for federal grant 
funding.  
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 The operational characteristics of each structure to include the duties, 
responsibilities, and functions executed by each entity. Although each 
structure’s concern is with homeland security issues, each approached its 
way of achieving its goals based on the type of structure utilized. While 
each structure studied is different, similarities also occur.  
 Budget concerns and its effects on continuing to fund homeland security 
initiatives on the local level and the amount of federal grant funding used 
in this regard. If the jurisdiction cannot receive enough funding through its 
operating budget and cannot supplement it with grant funding, then it 
would be difficult to support homeland security functions.  
The first step was to compare the local organizational missions to federal ones  to 
ascertain how closely they align. This alignment is important because it can affect the 
awarding of federal grants and can give the local jurisdiction guidance for tasks to be 
performed in its operational plan.  
For each jurisdiction containing a homeland security entity, its written mission 
statement was compared against the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), 
which defines the missions of the federal DHS.14 The core missions listed in the QHSR 
are: 1) prevent terrorism and enhance security, 2) secure and manage this nation’s 
borders, 3) enforce and administer immigration laws, 4) safeguard and secure cyberspace, 
and 5) ensure resilience to disasters.15  
In regard to the mission of preventing terrorism and enhancing security, the 
QHSR objectives are to: 
 understand, deter, and protect against terrorist attacks and stop the spread 
of violent extremism, as well as engage communities and protect 
government leaders,  
 anticipate, control, and protect against hostile uses of chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) attacks, and 
 manage risks to critical infrastructure.16  
For jurisdictions with an emergency management entity, their mission was 
compared to the mission statement of the FEMA, which states, “Emergency Management 
                                                 
14 “Our Mission,” accessed May 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/our-mission. 
15 Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Report: A Strategic 
Framework for a Secure Homeland (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 76–79. 
16 Ibid. 
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protects communities by coordinating and integrating all activities necessary to build, 
sustain, and improve the capability to mitigate against, prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from threatened or actual natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other man-made 
disasters.”17  
A budget comparison was conducted on each of the jurisdictions within the 
different organizational structures to examine funding for homeland security and 
emergency management. The comparison began with the earliest year possible after 9/11 
and continued to the latest year available. The subject matter for this analysis consisted of 
an inspection of the budgets allocated to homeland security and emergency management. 
The operational aspect of each jurisdiction was also examined. While the mission 
was compared to the QHSR, the actual tasks performed within the jurisdiction’s 
homeland security and emergency management entity were studied to see how closely 
these tasks compare to the mission statement.  
Lastly, a comparative analysis of the three types of organizational structures was 
conducted to include possible advantages and disadvantages of each structure.  
The information contained in this study was obtained through both written 
documentation and information obtained from leaders and decision makers in each of the 
three jurisdictions representing each organizational structure. Literature, and policy and 
procedure documents, were acquired along with financial records and grant money 
allocation records from the chosen jurisdictions. Organizational charts along with the 
operations as they relate to the duties performed by personnel for these jurisdictions may 
be analyzed to examine possible duplication of services between homeland security and 
other areas in the jurisdiction with similar responsibilities. When information was not 
available in written form, information was given by leaders and decision makers 
including homeland security directors, emergency management directors, and chiefs of 
fire or police services or their designees. 
                                                 
17 Wayne Blanchard, Guide to Emergency Management and Related Terms, Definitions, Concepts, 
Acronyms, Organizations, Programs, Guidance, Executive Orders, and Legislation, A Tutorial on 
Emergency Management, Broadly Defined, Past and Present (Washington, DC: FEMA, 2008), 344. 
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D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter introduced concerns that local jurisdictions are experiencing 
regarding how they incorporate homeland security. These problems include defining a 
homeland security mission, budget constraints, and determining the best organizational 
structure that fits their needs with intelligence, and communication between disciplines 
being an important factor for consideration. It is acknowledged that an organizational 
structure that works for some jurisdictions may not work for others. This analysis gives 
local jurisdictions information to be considered when deciding on an organizational 
structure. 
Chapter II is the literature review. The review included literature written by both 
practitioners and academics that addressed mission definition, budgeting, and the 
differences between homeland security and the all-hazards concept of emergency 
management.  
Chapter III covers the debate over the significance given to terrorism incidents 
versus natural disasters, determines if differences in the definition and missions in 
homeland security and the all-hazards emergency management concept exist, and 
introduces common sources of funding for homeland security and emergency 
management and the resulting challenges. Both practitioners and academics have 
produced literature that discusses these topics. Each topic plays a role in the decision of 
which organizational structure should be chosen by a jurisdiction based on its mission 
and responsibilities.  
Chapters IV, V, and VI reviewed each organizational structure: law enforcement 
homeland security, emergency management homeland security, and integrated law 
enforcement/emergency management homeland security, respectively. For each structure 
the following is presented. 
 The missions of the QHSR and the mission of FEMA were compared to 
the jurisdiction’s mission 
 The operations of each structure were studied to determine if they coincide 
more to terrorism, natural disasters, or all hazards 
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 The budget for each structure was examined for total funding versus that 
allotted for homeland security and emergency management along with 
grant funding  
Chapter VII concludes this thesis with the evaluation of information from each of 
the organizational structures and makes recommendations based on the information 
learned from the case studies. This chapter also shows the limitations of this study along 
with the need for future research into this subject matter.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review explores research that is important in discovering theories 
and thoughts on a national and local level regarding problems arising from the lack of a 
definitive mission for homeland security, budgeting issues as they relate to local 
jurisdictions, and homeland security as a separate entity or as a part of the all-hazards 
emergency management concept. Through the study of this literature, local jurisdictions 
could gain knowledge in determining smart practices as it relates to organizational 
structure for homeland security. Although some of the literature is dated, it still offers 
information that needs to be considered.  
An abundance of literature and research encompasses the all-hazards concept, 
grant allocation, funding for homeland security, and the mission confusion associated 
with no proper definition of homeland security. However, much research does not seem 
to have been conducted on how these issues affect homeland security on the local level. 
The categories examined in this literature review include the following.  
 The importance of a clearly defined homeland security mission  
 Budget comparisons of homeland security organizational structures  
 Homeland security versus all-hazard emergency management 
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF A CLEARLY DEFINED HOMELAND 
SECURITY MISSION 
The definition of homeland security is unclear on the federal level, causing 
confusion on the local levels as well. The entity responsible for homeland security on the 
local level, whether it be a standalone homeland security, all-hazards emergency 
management, or an integration of the two, needs a clear homeland security definition to 
determine its mission properly. Federal homeland security is still lacking in foundational 
principles and has left state and local governments with the problem of how to implement 
homeland security missions.18  
                                                 
18 Deanne B. Criswell, “Homeland Security: Developing National Doctrine to Guide State Strategy 
Development” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012). 
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The local jurisdictions must comply with federal mandates so that they may 
qualify for homeland security grants that help to offset some of the expenses incurred on 
the local level. According to a 2005 study by Veronique De Rugy titled “What Does 
Homeland Security Spending Buy?” one reason the mission seems unclear is because 
some of the activities associated with the DHS are not actually homeland security 
related.19  
Another concurring view is expressed by Shawn Reese, an analyst in emergency 
management and homeland security policy for the Congressional Research Service, when 
he stated,  
There is no evidence in the existing homeland security strategic 
documents that supports the aligning and prioritization of the varied 
missions, nor do any of the documents convey how national, state, or local 
resources are to be allocated to achieve these missions. Arguably, without 
prioritized resource allocation to aligned missions, the nation’s homeland 
security activities and operations may be haphazard and inconsistent.20  
The problem of not having a clearly defined mission can also lead back to the fact 
that no agreement exists in the definition of the discipline itself, which is evident when 
government documents, such as the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security, the 
2010 National Security Strategy, and the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, 
are examined.  
According to another statement made by Shawn Reece in 2012 presented to the 
Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations & 
Management House of Representatives,  
The debate over the varied definitions persists as the federal government 
continues to issue and implement homeland security strategy. All of the 
strategic documents discussed in this written testimony define homeland 
security as security efforts; however, each one defines these efforts in 
different terms. Examples of these documents include the 2007 and 2010 
National Security Strategy, the Strategic Plan—One Team, One Mission, 
                                                 
19 Veronique De Rugy, “What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?” American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research (2005): 8.  
20 Reese, Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations, 3. 
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Securing Our Homeland; the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security 
Review; and the Bottom-Up Review.21  
Table 1 shows the varying definitions of homeland security as it relates to the 
aforementioned documents. 
Table 1.   Summary of Homeland Security Definitions22 
Document Definition 
2010 National Security 
Strategy  
A seamless coordination among federal, state, and local governments 
to prevent, protect against and respond to threats and natural 
disasters23 
2007 National Strategy for 
Homeland Security  
A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the 
United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and 
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.24 
2010 Quadrennial Homeland 
Security Review  
A concerted national effort to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, 
and resilient against terrorism and other hazards where American 
interests, aspirations, and ways of life can thrive25 
2007 U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security Strategic 
Plan, Fiscal Years 2008–
2013  
A unified national effort to prevent and deter terrorist attacks, protect 
and respond to hazards, and to secure the national borders26 
2011 National Strategy For 
Counterterrorism  
Defensive efforts to counter terrorist threats27 
2010 Bottom-Up Review  Preventing terrorism, responding to and recovering from natural 
disasters, customs enforcement and collection of customs revenue, 
administration of legal immigration services, safety and stewardship 
of the nation’s waterways and marine transportation system, as well 
as other legacy missions of the various components of DHS28 
                                                 
21 Reese, Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations, 8–9. 
22 Shawn Reese, “Is DHS Effectively Implementing a Strategy to Counter Emerging Threats,” U.S. 
House of Representatives, Committee of Homeland Security, February 2012, 4, http://homeland.house.gov/ 
hearing/subcommitte-hearing-dhs-effectively-implementing-strategy-counter-emerging-threats. 
23 Office of the President, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: Office of the President, 2010), 
2.  
24 Homeland Security Council, The National Homeland Security Strategy (Washington, DC: Office of 
the President, 2007), 1.  
25 Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2010), 13.  
26 Department of Homeland Security, One Team, One Mission, Securing the Homeland: U.S. 
Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2008–2013 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, 2008), 3.  
27 Office of the President, National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: Office of the 
President, 2011), 11.  
28 Department of Homeland Security, Bottom-Up Review (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, 2010), 3.  
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Each definition has a common theme of preventing or securing the United States 
(U.S.) from different types of threats; however, some definitions list missions not even 
mentioned in the others.  
Additionally, in 2013, Jerome H. Kahan, an analyst at the Homeland Security 
Studies and Analysis Institute located in Arlington, VA, shows many missions associated 
with homeland security are not even related to the discipline. His article for the Journal 
of Homeland Security Education stated, “When DHS was formed, the Department was 
given a significant array of explicitly designated non-homeland security responsibilities 
in addition to its primary homeland security missions.”29 Some of these non-homeland 
security responsibilities include transnational criminal threats, administering and 
enforcing U.S. immigration laws, ensuring that appropriate customs fees are paid, 
preventing successful money laundering, keeping U.S. waterways safe, intercepting 
smuggling over the border of drugs, arms, humans, and illegal flora and fauna, and 
enforcing customs regulations.30  
Confusion in the mission is also seen where local law enforcement is involved. 
William Pelfrey, a writer for the Criminal Justice Policy Review, asserts that the federal 
government directed local law enforcement agencies to take steps toward terrorism 
preparedness and prevention, but the objectives were ambiguous and provided limited 
guidance.31  
Several presidential directives establish guidelines that help to support the mission 
of homeland security. The 2011 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) 
states,  
This directive is aimed at strengthening the security and resilience of the 
United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the 
greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, 
cyber attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters. Our national 
                                                 
29 Jerome H. Kahan, “What’s in a Name? The Meaning of Homeland Security,” Journal of Homeland 
Security Education 2 (2013): 4. 
30 Ibid.  
31 William V. Pelfrey, “An Exploratory Study of Local Homeland Security Preparedness Findings and 
Implications for Future Assessments,” Criminal Justice Policy Review 20, no. 3 (2009): 263–264.  
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preparedness is the shared responsibility of all levels of government, the 
private and nonprofit sectors, and individual citizens.32 
The 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) has the objective 
of ensuring that all levels of government across the nation have the capability to work 
efficiently and effectively together by developing an incident management system to 
improve crisis management.33 Coordination between agencies was seen as a major 
problem during the attacks of 9/11. This directive was put in place to attempt to rectify 
this problem.  
Federal departments and agencies have labeled some infrastructure around the 
nation as being critical. According to the 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
7 (HSPD-7) “The term ‘‘Federal departments and agencies’’ means those executive 
departments enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, and the Department of Homeland Security; 
independent establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1); Government corporations as 
defined by 5 U.S.C. 103(1); and the United States Postal Service.”34  
Under the 2003 Homeland Security Act, which references the definition in the 
PATRIOT Act, the term “critical infrastructure” (CI) means “systems and assets, whether 
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such 
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic 
security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”35 The 
term “key resources” (KR) means “publicly or privately controlled resources essential to 
the minimal operations of the economy and government.”36 HSPD-7 “establishes a 
national policy for Federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize United 
                                                 
32 Barack Obama, National Preparedness, Presidential Policy Directive PPD-8, Washington, DC: 
Barack Obama, 2011, Appendix B, 1. 
33 George W. Bush, Management of Domestic Incidents, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, 
Washington, DC: George W. Bush, 2003, 1. 
34 Ibid., 1817. 
35 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Sec. 1016, Critical Infrastructures Protection (e) 
Critical Infrastructure Defined, H.R. 3162–130. 
36 George W. Bush, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 7, Washington, DC: George W. Bush, 2003, Attachment B. 
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States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist 
attacks.”37 
B. THE COST/BENEFIT OF DIFFERENT HOMELAND SECURITY 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES  
The uncertainty of funding for local jurisdictions after 9/11 has led most local 
jurisdictions to look for ways to save money and to budget more wisely. The United 
States General Accounting Office released a 2002 study titled, National Preparedness, 
which stated,  
Since September 11th, many state and local governments have faced 
declining revenues and increased security costs. A survey of about 400 
conducted by the National League of Cities reported that since September 
11th, one in three American cities saw their local economies, revenues, 
and public confidence decline while public-safety is up. Further, the 
National Governors Association estimates year 2002 state budget 
shortfalls of between $40 billion and $50 billion, making it increasingly 
difficult for the states to take on expensive, new homeland security 
initiatives without federal assistance.38 
Although this study is dated, many local jurisdictions are still experiencing budget 
shortfalls.  
According to a 2008 study titled, “Financing Homeland Security and Emergency 
Preparedness: Use of Interlocal Cost-Sharing,” homeland security, natural disaster 
preparedness, and emergency management in general, often require major capital 
expenditures. The study also stated that the capital budgets of most local jurisdictions are 
underfunded.39  
                                                 
37 Bush, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, Attachment B. 
38 Randall A. Yim, National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector 
Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security (GAO-02-621T) (Washington, 
DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002), 17. 
39 Susan A. MacManus and Kiki Caruson, “Financing Homeland Security and Emergency 
Preparedness: Use of Interlocal Cost-Sharing,” Public Budgeting & Finance (Summer 2008): 53.  
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Another 2009 study titled, “Local Emergency Management Funding: An 
Evaluation of County Budgets” stated that jurisdictions over 100,000 people found the 
most pronounced homeland security concern to be lack of funding.40 
The cost of operating an independent homeland security department could be a 
concern, and also, a large part of the overall budget; however, it is the local jurisdiction’s 
duty to protect its citizens in the best way possible. The decision to eliminate homeland 
security from local jurisdictions may be a consideration, but may not be the best answer 
to saving money. The cost/benefit of a local operation could be improved by looking at 
different options and organizational structures of how homeland security could be 
executed . 
Federal grants are often used by local jurisdictions to offset costs based on 
homeland security initiatives. A common theme seen in most literature concerning 
federal grants is that local agencies have to conform to federal mandates to receive them. 
Federal grants have been provided to local jurisdictions to assist with the costs associated 
with preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery to both terrorism and natural 
disasters. The problem with this solution is that the local governments are required to 
conform to mandates to receive these funds; thereby, costing the agency more money to 
get funding. Susan E. Clarke and Erica Chenoweth composed a paper titled, “The Politics 
of Vulnerability: Constructing Local Performance Regimes for Homeland Security,” 
which stated that the lack of reimbursement for security expenses incurred in response to 
federal mandates is a local problem.41  
C. HOMELAND SECURITY VERSUS ALL-HAZARDS EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT 
A majority of recent literature seems to show homeland security moving to an all-
hazards concept; however, some literature illustrates that others tend to believe otherwise. 
                                                 
40 Skip Krueger, Eliot Jennings, and James M. Kendra, “Local Emergency Management Funding: An 
Evaluation of County Budgets,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 6, no. 1 
(2009): 4.  
41 Susan E. Clarke and Erica Chenoweth, “The Politics of Vulnerability: Constructing Local 
Performance Regimes for Homeland Security,” Review of Policy Research 23, no. 1 (2006): 102.  
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In the spring of 2005, George Haddow and Jane Bullock wrote a paper titled “The Future 
of Emergency Management” that stated,  
While professing to adopt an all-hazards approach, in reality DHS/FEMA 
has become focused almost exclusively on the terrorist threat to the near 
exclusion of traditional natural and technological hazards. Existing 
funding and staff resources have been reprogrammed at DHS/FEMA to 
terrorism-based activities and new resources are being applied almost 
exclusively to this threat. FEMA’s attention has been effectively diverted 
from any hazard beyond terrorism.42  
This position can also be seen in the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security, 
which states, “Today, homeland security is narrowly defined as dealing predominantly 
with acts of terrorism.”43 
An argument for moving to an all-hazards concept is made by Dr. William 
Waugh, a professor at Georgia State University, in his paper titled, “Terrorism and the 
All-Hazards Model,” in which he states, “All-hazards planning does encourage a broader 
perspective on risks and how to deal with them and a broader foundation on which to 
build effective programs to manage hazards and disasters.”44 
Another argument for the all-hazards concept is given by Thomas A. Birkland, a 
professor at North Carolina State University, who suggests that prior to 9/11, FEMA was 
in a decline as preparing for natural hazards took a back seat to terrorism. Natural disaster 
mitigation was declining and FEMA became more concerned with response rather than 
comprehensive emergency management based on the all-hazard concept. After 9/11, the 
response course was emphasized even further as attention to natural disasters decreased; 
however, after Hurricane Katrina, moving to the all-hazards approach seemed 
necessary.45 
                                                 
42 George Haddow and Jane Bullock, “The Future of Emergency Management,” paper presented at the 
Academic Emergency Management and Related Courses (AEMRC) for the Higher Education Program The 
Future of Emergency Management—Papers From The 2005 FEMA Emergency Management Higher 
Education Conference, 2005, ch. 4, 13.  
43 Homeland Security Council, The National Strategy for Homeland. 
44 William L. Waugh, “Terrorism and the All-hazards Model,” Journal of Emergency Management 2, 
no. 1 (2005): 8–10.  
45 Birkland, “Disasters, Catastrophes, and Policy Failure in the Homeland Security Era,” 423–438.  
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An area that may be lacking in an all-hazards emergency management concept is 
intelligence. Are emergency managers in a jurisdiction privy to the same intelligence as 
those in law enforcement homeland security? Although emergency managers may not 
need to know all classified intelligence, it may be necessary for them to know and 
understand the possible threats and targets to plan and mitigate for them properly. 
According to Valerie Lucus-McEwen in her journal article titled, “Recalibrating 
Emergency Management: Information Is Not the Same As Intelligence,” the emergency 
manager is primarily a planner and public relations expert. That manager may also be 
considered the expert authority during times of an emergency for decision makers.46 
Being able to plan properly means having access to what may be considered classified 
information, such as access to critical infrastructure plans or knowing what the potential 
terrorist targets are inside of their jurisdiction.  
The information sharing environment (ISE) of the Terrorist Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 is also concerned about getting intelligence to those that need it 
and states,  
The ISE, with a very small staff, is not focused solely on intelligence 
agencies, but works to establish consistent policy guidelines and 
technologies across five major communities—defense, intelligence, 
homeland security, foreign affairs, and law enforcement. It also reaches 
out to other agencies in the Federal Government and to state, local and 
tribal entities that are concerned with security issues.47  
The importance of a local homeland security entity is shown in arguments that 
have been made for changes in law enforcement organizations to deal with homeland 
security matters.48 Aallan Y. Jiao and Harry M. Rhea stated in an article titled, 
                                                 
46 Valerie Lucas-McEwen, “Recalibrating Emergency Management: Information Is Not the Same as 
Intelligence,” Emergency Management Magazine, December 29, 2010, http://www.emergencymgmt.com/ 
emergency-blogs/campus/Recalibrate-Emergency-Management-Information-Intelligence-122910.html. 
47 Richard A. Best Jr., Intelligence Information: Need-to-Know vs. Need-to-Share (CRS Report No. 
R41848) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 6. 
48 Erica Chenoweth and Susan E. Clarke, “All Terrorism is Local: Resources, Nested Institutions, and 
Governance for Urban Homeland Security in the American Federal System,” Political Research Quarterly 
63, no. 3 (2010): 495–507; George W. Burruss, Matthew J. Giblin, and Joseph A. Schafer, “Threatened 
Globally, Acting Locally: Modeling Law Enforcement Homeland Security Practices,” Justice Quarterly 27, 
no. 1 (2010): 79.  
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“Integration of Police in the United States: Changes and Development after 9/11,” that 
the reorganization of a police department is to “address potential terrorist attacks more 
effectively.”49 The way the reorganization is executed depends on the size of the 
jurisdiction along with its needs and the needs of the community it serves.  
Although much of the research deals with the federal government, as it relates to 
all hazards, the same implications are true on the local level. An abundance of literature 
on the all-hazards concept of emergency management is available, most of which is 
positive regarding the future path that should be taken by homeland security. It is, 
however, difficult to find literature that goes against this proposal. 
D. SUMMARY 
Issues explored in this literature review included the mission of homeland 
security, the budgetary concerns involving local jurisdictions, and the importance of 
distinguishing the difference between homeland security and all-hazards emergency 
management.  
Without a solid homeland security mission, it would be difficult for a local 
jurisdiction to implement a homeland security strategy. The objectives and 
responsibilities given to a local entity must agree with its mission, or confusion and 
ambiguity could occur from both a strategic and operational standpoint.  
In the years after 9/11, local agencies saw declining budgets. Although some 
budgets may have improved somewhat, funding is still a concern for homeland security 
on the local level. Federal grants are often used by local jurisdictions to offset budget 
reductions; however, the requirement of complying with federal mandates to be approved 
for the grants can cause financial hardship. Budgetary concerns, along with obtaining 
grant funding to offset expenses for homeland security, factor into which organizational 
structure would work best.  
                                                 
49 Allan Y. Jiao and Harry M. Rhea, “Integration of Police in the United States: Changes and 
Development After 9/11,” Policing & Society 17, no. 4 (2007): 389.  
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Literature in this review included journal articles, policy documents, books, and 
theses that examined if a terrorism-focused homeland security organization neglects 
natural disasters and other hazards. Although literature suggests that homeland security is 
moving to an all-hazards concept, other literature states that funding is still geared toward 
terrorism. A threat assessment of the local area would assist in the type of structure that 
would be best for a jurisdiction.  
Chapter III reviews matters relating to terrorism and natural disasters, the roles of 
homeland security and emergency management, as well as some of the funding areas 
associated with the two disciplines and their uses.  
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III. FACTORS IMPACTING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
DECISIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to show the debate over the significance given to 
terrorism incidents versus natural disasters, to determine if differences exist in the 
definition and missions in homeland security and the all-hazards emergency management 
concept, and to introduce common sources of funding for law enforcement homeland 
security and emergency management homeland security and the resulting challenges.  
This chapter assists local law enforcement homeland security and emergency 
management homeland security directors in their decision to implement one of the 
organizational structures featured in this study. The literature review in the previous 
chapter revealed that no guidance exists as to the most efficient organizational structure 
for these disciplines; therefore, it is incumbent on the decision makers within the local 
jurisdictions to be educated on factors that play an important role in their evaluation.  
A. TERRORISM VERSUS NATURAL DISASTERS 
The global terrorism database (GTD) defines terrorism as “the threatened or 
actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, 
religious, or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation.”50 According to the GTD, 
a total of 207 terrorist attacks occurred in the United States between 2001 and 2011,51 as 
compared to 693 disaster declarations that did not involve terrorism;52 however, much 
emphasis is still placed on planning and preparing for terrorist attacks at the expense  
of neglecting natural disasters, which can be seen in grant funding allocation for each 
issue. As an example, funding available for hazards other than terrorism, such as the 
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), has been reduced and the match 
                                                 
50 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Integrated United 
States Security Database (IUSSD): Data on the Terrorist Attacks in the United States Homeland, 1970 to 
2011, Final Report to Resilient Systems Division, DHS Science and Technology Directorate (College Park, 
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requirements for local governments has increased.53 Prior to the attacks of 9/11, the 
Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) received funding of approximately 
$250 million. After 9/11, the EMPG grant dipped to just under $200 million and  
the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) steadily increased from approximately 
$200 million in 2002 to over $1.6 billion in 2004.54 Fiscal year 2013 still showed a 
substantial difference in the two grants with the HSGP totaling $968 million and the 
EMPG totaling $332 million.55  
Some argue that the neglect of natural disasters was shown in the inept response 
to Hurricane Katrina. In a 2005 Washington Post article, the statement was made that 
homeland security almost consisted entirely of protection against terrorism and 
questioned the decision at the time that FEMA would no longer be responsible for 
disaster preparedness. The article continued to state that this decision did not make sense 
given the country’s long record of natural disasters.56 Local governments are pressured 
through both political and public means to prepare themselves for a terrorist attack. At 
times, this preparation for terrorism could lead to focus being taken off any other existing 
hazards, even if they pose a more significant threat to the jurisdiction.  
In a 2005 policy review, Patrick S. Roberts shows that Congress has funded 
counterterrorism initiatives without a proper risk analysis and reduced its commitment to 
emergency preparedness and response to natural disasters.57 This imbalance is expressed 
in the reduction of funding for natural disasters and increased funding for 
counterterrorism grants after 2001. In 2004, state homeland security grants increased 10 
times over the 2001 amounts while emergency preparedness programs lost funding.58 
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During the years of 1970 to 2005, the most costly catastrophes in the world as judged by 
lives lost and cost in dollars were natural disasters with the exception of 9/11.59  
Since natural disasters occur more frequently than incidents of terrorism, it may 
benefit local jurisdictions to abstain from spending a large amount of limited funds on 
homeland security issues, such as terrorism, and instead concentrate on an emergency 
management all-hazards approach. The all-hazards approach to emergency management 
includes terrorism along with other possible hazards, but as with other hazards, 
emphasizes the terrorism risk based on a jurisdictional threat assessment. The shift to all-
hazards from a primarily all terrorism approach is reminiscent of FEMA’s change from 
concentrating on civil defense during the Cold War and moving to a program that 
recognizes the need for overall disaster relief, recovery, and mitigation.60 However, if 
homeland security was eliminated to emphasize the all-hazards approach, some negative 
consequences could result. One important aspect would be the possible loss of 
intelligence gathering and investigations related to terrorism based on the intelligence 
gathered. 
Both differences and similarities arise in natural disasters and terrorism in regard 
to how they are handled. Some of the similarities lie in the way local agencies prevent, 
mitigate, respond to, and recover from each type of incident. Regardless of the reason for 
the situation, many of the first responders will react in a similar way. As an example, 
whether it is a toxic chemical spill caused by a train derailment or a terrorist attack using 
the same toxic chemical, the response and recovery will be almost identical from an 
operational standpoint. Some differences when taking response and recovery into account 
during a terrorist event are that the first responders must consider that the affected area is 
a crime scene and must be examined for evidence and the potential also exists for 
secondary attacks including chemical, biological, explosive, or nuclear weapons. 
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A major difference between natural disasters and terrorism is that some natural 
disasters can be predicted and give those persons who could be affected time to prepare 
or leave the area. Natural disasters are more predictable than terrorism because of 
historical data that has been accumulated regarding floods, earthquakes, and hurricanes.61 
Planning for natural disasters is also more simplistic because it is easier to protect life and 
property when a good idea of what the threat looks like and where it may occur does 
exist. Terrorism, although not entirely unpredictable, is more difficult to forecast or 
predict because terrorists could strike anywhere at any time without notice. Terrorists 
could change the nature of their attacks very quickly if they learn of protective measures 
that have been implemented that would lessen the likelihood of their success. This 
strategy is called the substitution effect.62 In an effort to predict terrorism, a calculation 
of risk could be conducted. In 2003, an insurance firm surveyed intelligence experts and 
applied risk ratings to a database of potential targets to price terrorism insurance rates. 
The formula consisted of population density, critical infrastructure, and credible threats.63  
Intelligence gathering is important in the prediction or forecast of terrorist events. 
Also, intelligence can provide the most information possible to assist with the 
preparedness and mitigation phases regarding terrorist attacks. Regardless of the 
reliability of intelligence, all potential targets cannot be protected from terrorism. Bruce 
Hoffman, in his 2002 article titled, “Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 
9/11,” emphasizes that the sheer number of vulnerable locations makes this impossible; 
therefore, political leaders and civilians must have realistic expectations of what can and 
cannot be accomplished at all levels of government regarding the fight against 
terrorism.64 
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B. ROLES OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT 
After 9/11, policymakers decided that a new approach was needed to handle 
large-scale terrorist attacks; therefore, presidential directives were issued on this matter in 
the name of homeland security. Homeland security is a combination of law enforcement, 
disaster, immigration, and terrorism issues.65 Although homeland security includes all 
these areas, jurisdictions can choose to handle each of them in different ways. Some 
jurisdictions choose to allow an independent homeland security entity staffed by law 
enforcement to manage terrorism while others choose to use the all-hazards emergency 
management concept or a combination of the two.  
FEMA defines emergency management as, “the managerial function charged with 
creating the framework within which communities reduce vulnerability to hazards and 
cope with disasters.”66 The mission of emergency management as stated by FEMA is, 
“Emergency Management protects communities by coordinating and integrating all 
activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the capability to mitigate against, 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from threatened or actual natural disasters, acts of 
terrorism, or other man-made disasters.”67  
Regarding the all-hazards concept, a DHS report titled, “FEMA’s Progress in All-
Hazards Mitigation,” states,  
Hazards typically fall into three broad categories: natural, technological, 
and manmade. Natural hazards are generally associated with weather and 
geological events, such as a flood, hurricane, tornado, or earthquake. 
Technological hazards refer to human activities such as dam and levee 
construction or the manufacture, transportation, storage, and use of 
hazardous materials. Manmade hazards are typically associated with a 
criminal or terrorist attack using weapons such as an explosive, biological, 
or chemical agent. However, natural disasters can also be compounded by 
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manmade and technological hazards to the extent that disaster losses could 
be prevented through mitigation.68  
A definition of all-hazards given by Kimberly Nagal, a Certified Emergency 
Manager (CEM) from Wright State University, states, “An all-hazards approach to 
emergency preparedness encourages effective and consistent response to any disaster or 
emergency, regardless of the cause.”69 All hazards not only takes into account the 
hazards themselves, but also the concept considers the steps that increase the level of 
preparedness for all hazards.70 
Emergency management from a local/county standpoint is responsible in part for 
coordinating and supporting emergency response activities, maintaining the EOC, 
developing a county comprehensive emergency management plan, designing and 
implementing emergency preparedness and response training and exercises, and 
conducting regular hazard and threat analyses.71  
C. HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
FUNDING 
After the attacks of 9/11, federal dollars through grants were used to enhance the 
homeland security capabilities of local jurisdictions. Several years later, the U.S. 
economy weakened, which also affected local homeland security and emergency 
management budgets. Jurisdictions had the challenge of homeland security despite fiscal 
constraints.72 Police departments are struggling to maintain routine levels of police 
services much less having the ability to expand their missions.73 Homeland security 
preparedness efforts by state and local governments are suffering due to budgetary 
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constraints.74 The federal government offers grants to assist with the costs of maintaining 
a homeland security entity; however, with the reduced budgets, are the grants enough? 
The history of funding for homeland security gives insight to the jurisdictions’ ability to 
continue funding homeland security efforts. 
Funding for both homeland security and emergency management can come from 
several different areas. Two of the most common funding sources are through the 
jurisdictions’ budget process and federal grants. Three federal grants target public safety 
preparedness and are used to supplement local budgets. These grants are the HSGP, the 
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), and the EMPG. 
The funding provided through homeland security grants is to increase local 
capabilities and supplement the local budget for emergency preparedness.75 Homeland 
security grants, although they are a good source of funding, have not gone without debate 
or scrutiny. Arguments arise as to whether these grants should be used for terrorism only 
or for more of an all-hazards approach.76 Also, homeland security grants have come 
under question regarding their use.  
It is believed in some circles that homeland security grants are being misused and 
wasted for unnecessary equipment and other items not needed by a jurisdiction. One 
argument is that some grant money has been spent based on political objectives, known 
as pork barrel spending;77 the UASI grant program is an example. The UASI is a federal 
program intended to assist major cities most at risk to a terrorist attack and increase their 
preparedness and close security gaps. The UASI grants have come under scrutiny due to 
the danger of the grant program moving from a risk-based program targeting security 
gaps to one of an entitlement program.78 
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D. SUMMARY 
This chapter focused on three topics as it relates to the organizational structures 
involved in the following case studies. These topics are terrorism versus natural disasters, 
the difference between homeland security and the all-hazards concept, and funding for 
homeland security.  
Since its inception, homeland security has been faced with an identity crisis, 
caused in part to no agreed upon definition for the discipline. Some practitioners and 
academics are of the belief that homeland security focuses on terrorism too heavily with 
not enough concern being given to natural disasters and other threats. Others believe 
homeland security’s main responsibility is to protect against terrorism. Decision makers 
in local jurisdictions must understand what they wish to accomplish based on their 
mission and then choose the best organizational structure to meet that need. 
Understanding the difference between terrorism and natural disasters, and how they are 
handled from both a strategic and operational standpoint, will contribute to 
accomplishing this task.  
An understanding of the all-hazards emergency management concept as it 
compares to homeland security is imperative. Without this understanding, local leaders 
would have a difficult challenge in matching their mission to the proper structure that 
would best compliment what they desire for their community.  
The funding process for homeland security is important, because without proper 
funding, the jurisdiction is left with no way to carry on the discipline regardless of the 
chosen structure. Applying for grant funding can be confusing especially when federal 
mandates are applied or the mission does not coincide with what the federal government 
deems to be acceptable.  
Chapter IV begins the case studies for the three organizational structures. This 
chapter discusses the organizational structure related to the law enforcement homeland 
security entity. The study begins with analyzing the mission statement and compares it to 
the federal mission. Next, the operational procedures and budget information is discussed 
for the chosen jurisdiction in this case study.  
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IV. CASE STUDY A: LAW ENFORCEMENT HOMELAND 
SECURITY ENTITY 
The local law enforcement homeland security entity is centered on the prevention 
and response to terrorism. Most organizational structures with this type of homeland 
security entity place it under the local police department. Within this type of 
organizational structure, homeland security works with the local emergency management 
agency on planning for terrorism-related events and other activities that may need law 
enforcement intervention; however, they are a totally separate entity.  
A. BACKGROUND 
The jurisdiction chosen for this organizational structure is the City of Atlanta, 
Georgia. The City of Atlanta is located in the north central Georgia area and has a 
population of just under 450,000 residents.79  
The City of Atlanta police department (APD) falls under the Office of the Mayor 
and the police chief reports to the mayor. The homeland security unit is attached to the 
Special Enforcement Section (SES), which is a component of the Criminal Investigations 
Division (CID).80 SES not only contains the homeland security unit, but also a gang unit, 
vice unit, and narcotics unit. SES is commanded by a major who reports to the assistant 
chief over CID. The assistant chief reports to the chief of police. Figure 1 depicts the 
APD organizational chart.  
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Figure 1.  Atlanta Police Department Organizational Chart83
                                                 
83 Claude Moore (City of Atlanta Police Department Planning Research and Accreditation Unit), email message to the author, August 4, 2014 
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The homeland security unit consists of five investigators supervised by a 
lieutenant. Neither the special enforcement section nor the homeland security unit has a 
separate organizational chart.  
B. MISSION 
The APD homeland security unit does not have an official mission statement, but 
the unit lists its responsibilities in the 2011–2012 annual report as gathering, collating, 
analyzing, and disseminating information relating to criminal activity, to include 
domestic and international terrorism, that presents a threat to the community.84  
When comparing these responsibilities to the missions set forth in the QHSR, they 
meet many of the missions; however, some are not addressed. When looking at the 
responsibilities of the homeland security unit, most of the tasks are intelligence related; 
however, the tasks do conform to some goals of Mission #1 in the QHSR, which is stated 
as “prevent terrorism and enhance security.”  
The QHSR states that one of the goals in Mission #1 includes analyzing, fusing, 
and disseminating terrorism information.85 The APD policy manual for the special 
enforcement section, which contains the homeland security unit, lists tasks associated 
with this mission. These tasks include maintaining intelligence files on major criminals 
and criminal activity rings within the Metro Atlanta area, gathering and analyzing 
criminal intelligence information, and disseminating this information to the proper 
authorities.86  
Goals under Mission #1 listed in the QHSR and not listed in the homeland 
security unit’s responsibilities is the prevention of CBRN threats, critical infrastructure, 
border security, and immigration laws. While CBRN is not listed under the 
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responsibilities of the Homeland Security Unit, these incidents are investigated by the 
unit. Responding to these types of incidents is carried out through the Special Operations 
Section, which includes Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) and Explosive Ordinance 
Disposal (EOD) and is under the Field Operations Division.87 The Homeland Security 
Unit also conducts site assessments and buffer protection plans for critical infrastructure 
within its jurisdiction to allow the unit to comply with the goal under Mission #1 of the 
QHSR of reducing the risk to critical infrastructure. 
The QHSR Mission #2, securing and managing U.S. borders, as well as Mission 
#3, enforcing and administering U.S. immigration laws, are not conducted directly by the 
Atlanta Police Homeland Security Unit. The APD Homeland Security Unit assigns a 
representative to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and works with the state fusion 
center to obtain information on these topics.88 
Mission #4, safeguarding and securing cyberspace, is a component of the 
Homeland Security Unit. The Cyber Crime Squad (CCS) assists in the investigation of 
any crime that involves the use of computers to include technology theft.89 The squad 
assists the Federal Cyber Crimes Taskforce by supporting investigations through an 
initial review of electronic media in situations that cannot be completed by the case 
investigator. These duties correlate to Mission #4 in the QHSR of safeguarding and 
securing cyberspace.  
The comparison of the tasks of the Homeland Security Unit and those of Mission 
#5, strengthening national preparedness and resilience, show some correlation exists in 
enhancing national preparedness and mitigating hazards and vulnerabilities. The 
investigation of cyber crimes and collecting and disseminating intelligence information 
falls under these goals; however, all hazards are not represented. The preparedness, 
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mitigation, and recovery from natural disasters are carried out through the Atlanta Fulton 
County Emergency Management Agency (AFCEMA) with input from the APD when 
needed. AFCEMA is a totally separate entity. Table 2 shows APD’s Homeland Security 
Unit’s compliance with the missions of the QHSR. 
Table 2.   Atlanta Police Homeland Security Compliance with QHSR 
QHSR Missions Does Atlanta Police Align with QHSR? 
Mission #1: Prevent terrorism and enhance 
security 
YES 
Mission #2: Secure and manage our 
borders 
NO* 
Mission #3: Enforce and administer 
immigration laws 
NO* 
Mission #4: Safeguard and secure 
cyberspace 
YES 
Mission #5: Strengthen national 
preparedness and resilience 
PARTIALLY** 
*indicates the mission is managed on federal or state level and information related to jurisdiction is 
received from these entities.  
**includes terrorism but not all hazards to include natural disasters 
 
C. OPERATIONS 
Officers assigned to the Homeland Security Unit perform intelligence gathering 
activities, respond to the scene of any criminal activity deemed important to homeland 
security, and assist in joint investigations and intelligence gathering activities with 
outside agencies at the discretion of the Chief of Police or his designee.90 The Homeland 
Security Unit also operates the Atlanta Criminal Information Network that is used for 
information exchange both outside and inside the police department.91 
The types of information used in intelligence gathering are divided into four 
categories as follows.  
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 Raw data: information that may be fragmentary or unsubstantiated, but 
may provide an indication of possible criminal activity  
 Significant information: has obvious value and may justify further inquiry 
or the initiation of a criminal investigation 
 Strategic intelligence: information about existing patterns or trends of 
criminal activity collected over time 
 Tactical intelligence: information about a specific event or situation that 
can be put to use immediately92 
The Homeland Security Unit responds to criminal incidents deemed important to 
homeland security as listed in the Atlanta Police policy/standard operating procedure 
manual. These incidents include terrorism, organized crime, money laundering, 
trafficking, and other criminal activities of a serious nature.93  
As stated previously, a considerable emphasis is placed on intelligence in the 
Homeland Security Unit. The collection of intelligence is based on criminal conduct or 
activities that pose a threat to the community. The information collected on potential 
threats or criminal conduct includes the following. 
 Organized crime and gang activity 
 Terrorism or subversive activity involving the calculated use of violence 
or the threat of violence to attain political, religious, or ideological goals 
by instilling fear, using intimidation, or coercion  
 Vice activity relating to prostitution, bookmaking, gambling, child 
pornography, or obscenity 
 White collar incidents elating to computer crimes 
 Controlled substance activity 
 Civil disturbance activities94 
Terrorism is listed as a potential threat in this list along with other activities that may not 
seem terrorism related, but funding for terrorism-related activities can come from a 
variety of information contained in the other listed crimes.  
The Homeland Security Unit investigators receive intelligence information from 
other departmental units via suspicious activity reports (SARs), email communication, or 
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by telephone conversations. The unit also has a close working relationship with the JTTF 
and the state fusion center that provides intelligence information. When intelligence 
information is received or a threat is made, the Homeland Security Unit attempts to verify 
it through secondary sources. Using a collation and analytical process, those assigned to 
the Homeland Security Unit recommends further action. The investigators also complete 
intelligence reports and review other incoming reports. Any report not reviewed by an 
investigator is turned over to an analyst for review.95  
Most of the intelligence information in the Homeland Security Unit is considered 
FOUO. Active records are not disseminated without the approval of the Special 
Enforcement Section commander. Some reports are classified as “sensitive” and have 
more stringent controls. Incoming intelligence information is considered raw data and is 
not disseminated without the approval from the Chief of Police.96 The Homeland 
Security Unit also works closely with the JTTF and the state fusion center for intelligence 
information gathering, analysis, and dissemination.97  
D. BUDGETARY INFORMATION 
The budget information was received from the City of Atlanta Department of 
Finance and the APD business manager. A review of the total APD budget was 
conducted for the years 2002 through 2013. The same time frame could not be provided 
for the Homeland Security Unit’s budget or for the grant information. The homeland 
security budget reviewed was for the years 2008 through 2013, and the grant information 
was for the years 2003 through 2007. Monies allocated for homeland security are a 
category within the APD budget; however, it is a separate fund not included in the overall 
operating budget. The limited homeland security budget and grant information made it 
difficult to provide a true comparison; however the information provided still showed 
some trends.  
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In 2002, the overall police department budget was approximately $119 million. It 
increased gradually through 2005 to approximately $159 million. In 2006, a slight 
decrease occurred that dropped the budget to just under $133 million. In 2007, it 
remained steady at $138 million. The year 2008 saw an increase to over $169 million 
with the following years through 2013 remaining fairly steady with a peak in 2009 of 
approximately $172 million and approximately $167 million in 2013.98 
The budget allocated to homeland security could only be evaluated for the years 
of 2008 through 2013. The jurisdiction could not provide information prior to 2013. In 
2008, the homeland security operating budget was the lowest of all the amounts provided 
at $6,765. The budget more than doubled in 2009 to $17,362. After 2009, the homeland 
security budget made drastic increases compared to the previous two years with 2010 
increasing to $212,271, and continued to increase to $233,812 in 2011 before taking a 
slight decrease in 2012 to $217, 838. The budget declined significantly in 2013 to 
$86,782.99 (See Figure 2.) 
                                                 
98 City of Atlanta Police Department departmental budget, years 2002–2013.  
99 Spreadsheet of City of Atlanta Police Department, Homeland Security Operating Budget 2008–
2013. Tracy Woodard (City of Atlanta Police Department Business Manager), email message to the author, 
August 4, 2014. 
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Figure 2.  Atlanta Police Overall Budget and the Homeland Security Budget (in 
Million Dollars/Year) 
Grant funding was utilized by the Homeland Security Unit. However, information 
could only be provided for the years 2003 through 2007; therefore, it is impossible to see 
the trends of grant funding for future years. The homeland security grants ranged from 
$1.2 million in 2003 to approximately $440,000 in 2007. Through the years provided, 
after 2003, grant funding was sporadic with $580,000 in 2004, $950,000 in 2005, and 
$120,000 in 2006. (See Figure 3.) 
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Figure 3.  Atlanta Police Homeland Security Grant Funding (in Million 
Dollars/Year) 
E. ANALYSIS  
Many of the tasks performed by the APD Homeland Security Unit revolve around 
intelligence gathering, analysis, and preparing intelligence reports for dissemination both 
inside and outside the department. The unit has a close working relationship with the 
JTTF and the state fusion center, which allows for a more expedient flow of information. 
The advantage of concentrating on intelligence operations is the ability potentially to 
prevent acts of terrorism and enhance the security of the jurisdiction, which meets the 
goals of Mission #1 of the QHSR. Being a law enforcement entity allows better access to 
information due to its ability to obtain clearances. Another advantage to this entity is that 
it can take enforcement action if necessary. The ability to make arrests and conduct 
criminal investigations gives the jurisdiction an advantage because it can expedite the 
process of locating criminals and terrorists, and make an arrest; thereby, improving its 
ability to prevent possible attacks or criminal wrongdoing.  
The APD Homeland Security Unit operates an intelligence center named the 
Atlanta Criminal Information Network. This network is similar to a fusion center on the 
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local level. The network allows for the exchange of intelligence information or any other 
information that may affect the city of Atlanta or the surrounding Metro Atlanta area. The 
analysis and dissemination of intelligence information conforms to the goal of preventing 
terrorist attacks listed under Mission #1 of the QHSR.  
Although providing intelligence information to members of their own department 
and to outside agencies is an advantage, some intelligence cannot be disseminated 
without prior approval of either the special enforcement section commander or the Chief 
of Police. This procedure could hinder the release of important actionable intelligence or 
other information from being released in a timely manner.  
Another area involving intelligence information that involves a duplication of 
services is that both investigators and intelligence analysts are tasked with the same 
duties. 
Although the intelligence aspect of this entity is strong, a duplication of services 
is based on the investigators and intelligence analysts both conducting information 
analysis and reviewing information for authenticity. Due to the investigators also being 
involved in the analysis aspect of intelligence, the investigation of possible criminal 
activity could suffer. This duplication of services could be rectified by allowing the 
intelligence analysts exclusively to scrutinize the information coming in and remove this 
task from the investigators, which would free up the investigators to look further into the 
legitimate information without having to take the time to decipher less beneficial data. 
Also, approval through the chain of command is needed before the dissemination of 
information can occur, which lessens the timely release of actionable intelligence.  
Regarding Mission #2 of the QHSR, managing U.S. borders, and Mission #3, 
enforcement of immigration laws, the Homeland Security Unit relies on information from 
its representative with the JTTF. The unit does not have a representative from a federal 
agency assigned as a liaison to assist with these issues. 
The cyber crimes squad under the Homeland Security Unit allows for 
investigators attached to this squad to concentrate solely on crimes involving cyberspace. 
Its affiliation with the Federal Cyber Crimes Taskforce allows the unit to remain up-to-
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date on all current intelligence information involving cyber security, as well as conduct 
investigations in this area with the assistance of federal authorities. Mission #4, safeguard 
and secure cyberspace, is fulfilled with the cyber crimes squad.  
Although the responsibilities of disseminating intelligence information fall within 
the QHSR of maturing and strengthening homeland security, the Homeland Security Unit 
is focused entirely on terrorism-related subjects. Their mission or operations does not 
include all hazards, such as natural disasters. Preparing and planning for these types of 
events are handled through the AFCEMA. By not conducting any operations based on 
natural disasters, the ability to mitigate, respond, and recover effectively from these types 
of disasters is limited; therefore, the Homeland Security Unit’s compliance with Mission 
#5 of the QHSR is weakened.  
The APD overall budget steadily increased from 2002 through 2009 and remained 
fairly consistent up to 2013. The homeland security budget more than doubled from 2008 
to 2009, then drastically increased in 2010, and remained steady through 2012. The 
significant increase of the homeland security budget in 2010 did not coincide with an 
increase in the total APD budget nor did it include grant funding. This increase shows the 
importance placed on homeland security within the APD during these years. The limited 
information available regarding the homeland security operating budget made it 
impossible to analyze during the years of 2002 through 2007.  
The only years available for analysis concerning the homeland security grants 
awarded to APD were 2003 through 2007. The year 2003 had the largest grant award at 
$1.2 million. The overall APD operating budget had increased in 2003 from 2002; 
therefore, the grants were not used to supplement a budget shortfall. The overall budget 
from 2003 to 2007 remained consistent with little fluctuation as the grant funds were 
sporadic after 2003 ranging from slightly under $1.0 million in 2005 to approximately 
$120,000 in 2006.  
The law enforcement homeland security entity has the advantage of maintaining a 
single budget consisting of only the police department, whereas the other entities studied 
in this thesis, are concerned with more than one budget that could consist of a 
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combination from the police department, the fire department, and emergency 
management depending on the type of structure utilized. This simpler budget process 
permits the funding to go to one department without the concerns of separating the 
funding between more than one. 
A disadvantage of having a simple budget for this particular organizational 
structure is that a law enforcement only homeland security organization is limited in the 
types of grants that can fund its operations. Homeland security grants are utilized in this 
instance, but grants within the emergency management discipline, such as the EMPG, are 
not used.  
Table 3 shows both the advantages and disadvantages to the law enforcement 
homeland security entity in the form of a table.  
Table 3.   Advantages and Disadvantages of the Law Enforcement Homeland 
Security Entity 
ADVANTAGES 
 Strong compliance with Missions #1 and #4 of the QHSR through intelligence 
and cyber security 
 Ability to take enforcement action if necessary 
 Budget does not have to be separated between two disciplines (homeland security 
and emergency management) 
DISADVANTAGES 
 Weakened compliance with QHSR Mission #5 due to focus on terrorism only 
with no responsibilities toward natural disasters or all hazards 
 Duplication of services between investigators and intelligence analysts 
 Release of possible actionable intelligence hindered due to prior approval needed 
through chain of command 
 Limitation on grant funds due to a one discipline focus 
 
The law enforcement homeland security entity is concerned with both criminal 
and terrorist activities. Much less emphasis is placed on natural disasters, which are 
handled primarily by the jurisdiction’s emergency management agency. Intelligence 
gathering and analysis encompass the majority of the operational tasks for this entity. 
Due to the main component of this entity being intelligence as it relates to criminal 
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activity and terrorism, preparing for natural disasters is left to the jurisdiction’s 
emergency management agency. The next chapter analyzes an emergency management 
homeland security structure.  
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V. CASE STUDY B: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
HOMELAND SECURITY 
The emergency management homeland security entity handles all types of hazards 
including both natural and man-made disasters, as well as terrorism. This type of 
structure is normally managed by civilians with law enforcement participating on an as 
needed basis, such as in a working group for a project requiring their expertise.  
A. BACKGROUND 
The jurisdiction chosen for this organizational structure is Hall County, GA. Hall 
County is located approximately 50 miles north of Atlanta. The population of Hall 
County is estimated at approximately 188,000 residents.100 
The Hall County Emergency Management Agency falls under the Hall County 
Fire Department and the fire chief also acts as the emergency management director. (See 
Figure 4) The fire chief/emergency management director reports to the Hall County 
Board of Commissioners. No organizational chart exists specifically for emergency 
management. 
                                                 
100 “Hall County, GA,” accessed August 2014, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/13/13139.html.  
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Figure 4.  Hall County Fire Department Organizational Chart101 
                                                 
101 Rhonda Smith (Hall County Fire Services, Administrative Coordinator), email message to the author, August 5, 2014. 
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B. MISSION 
The mission of the Hall County Emergency Management Agency (HCEMA) is 
stated as follows. 
To provide a comprehensive and aggressive all-hazards approach to 
homeland security and disaster initiatives, mitigation, preparedness, 
response, recovery and special events. The purpose of our mission is to 
protect life and property and to prevent and/or reduce the negative impact 
of natural and man-made events in Hall County.102 
This mission statement closely resembles that of FEMA by stating its initiatives of 
preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery; however, the HCEMA’s statement 
mentions all hazards and homeland security whereas FEMA breaks the mission down 
further into natural disasters, terrorism, and other man-made disasters.  
Regarding the correlation to FEMA’s mission statement, the main concern of 
HCEMA is the development of plans that protect the community from all hazards. These 
plans include a hazard mitigation plan, a continuity of operations plan, and a winter 
weather plan.103  
The hazard mitigation plan lists the known hazards that affect the area of Hall 
County based on the history of past events. The plan then ranks these hazards or threats 
as the most likely and the least likely to occur. The plan then sets out steps to best handle 
each particular hazard/threat.  
The continuity of operations plan is a contingency plan that allows Hall County to 
maintain its normal business practices should critical infrastructure or technology be 
damaged or destroyed due to natural or man-made events including terrorism. 
Each of the aforementioned plans includes the response and recovery that would 
be required to handle the particular event. Through this planning process under HCEMA, 
its mission corresponds to the mission of FEMA by protecting its community through 
                                                 
102 “Emergency Management Agency,” accessed August 2014, http://www.hallcounty.org/fire 
services/fire_ema.asp. 
103 David Kimbrell (Director, Hall County Emergency Management), in discussion with the author, 
July 23, 2014. 
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preparing, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from the hazards/threats that are 
congruent to its jurisdiction.  
Since HCEMA’s mission statement specifically included homeland security, its 
mission and operations were compared to the missions of the QHSR to determine how 
closely they are related.  
Under QHSR Mission #1, preventing terrorism and enhancing security, HCEMA 
is involved in both CBRNE and critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) 
operations, but primarily through response versus prevention. The goal referencing 
CBRNE under Mission #1 is concerned with anticipating threats, identifying unlawful 
acquisition and movement of CBRNE materials, and the detection and hostile use of 
these weapons.104 When a CBRNE event occurs within the jurisdiction, HCEMA 
coordinates the response from the Hall County Fire Department (HCFD). The HCFD’s 
operational tasks do not include those listed under the CBRNE goals of the QHSR. The 
Hall County Sheriff’s Office (HCSO) also responds to these events due having a CBRNE 
response team. The HCFD is responsible for decontamination procedures while the 
HCSO conducts the investigation.105 The investigation performed by the HCSO after an 
incident could include the goals listed for CBRNE under the QHSR, but the HCFD and 
the emergency management homeland security entity do not participate in accomplishing 
these goals.  
HCEMA participates in CIKR operations by assisting with threat assessments and 
developing a continuity of operations plan that would be used in response to a piece of 
critical infrastructure being disabled. HCEMA also works closely with the HCSO in 
conducting threat assessments and security planning involving the critical infrastructure 
within the jurisdiction.106 This task does meet one of the goals under Mission #1 of the 
                                                 
104 Department of Homeland Security, 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 76, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 
2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf. 
105 Kimbrell, in discussion with the author. 
106 Ibid. 
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QHSR by enhancing security for critical infrastructure against terrorism and criminal 
activity.  
HCEMA does not conduct any business as it relates to Mission #2, securing and 
managing U.S. borders, and Mission #3, enforcing and administering U.S. immigration 
laws. The HCSO does have a partnership with Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) through the Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and 
Nationality Act. This act delegates authority for immigration enforcement within the 
HCSO’s jurisdiction.107 
In regard to Mission #4, safeguarding and securing cyberspace, as it pertains to 
the Hall County government, it is not controlled by HCEMA. The security and protection 
of cyberspace within Hall County is the responsibility of the jurisdiction’s information 
technology (IT) section. HCEMA does, however, develop redundancy plans along with 
the City of Gainesville, which is located in Hall County, to prepare for the possible loss 
of computer services.108 As the IT section is responsible for cyber security, if the 
computer systems fail, HCEMA would not know what threats exist that could cause this 
situation. 
Mission #5, mature and strengthen homeland security, is covered under HCEMA 
through its partnerships with the HCSO and the IT section. It is also implemented with 
HCEMA’s development of plans that create innovative approaches and effective 
solutions for a variety of hazards/threats through its hazard mitigation plan and 
emergency operations plan.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
107 “Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act,” accessed 
September 2014, http://www.ice.gov/287g/.  
108 Kimbrell, in discussion with the author. 
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Table 4.   Alignment of HCEMA Missions to the QHSR Missions 
QHSR Missions Does Hall County Align with QHSR? 
Mission #1: Prevent terrorism and Enhance 
Security 
Partially* 
Mission #2: Secure and Manage our 
Borders 
No 
Mission #3: Enforce and Administer 
Immigration Laws 
No 
Mission #4: Safeguard and Secure 
Cyberspace 
Partially** 
Mission #5: Strengthen National 
Preparedness and Resilience  
Yes 
*HCEMA meets one of the goals under Mission #1 of the QHSR “Prevent Terrorism and Enhance 
Security” regarding CIKR 
**HCEMA does not safeguard and secure cyberspace; however, the agency does develop redundancy 
plans 
 
C. OPERATIONS 
The Hall County job class specification for the position of emergency 
management specialist states that a comprehensive knowledge of emergency 
management, homeland security, emergency operations planning, hazard mitigation 
planning, and EOC readiness is needed. These tasks are performed under the direction of 
the emergency management director.109 
The job class specification provides a description of the major duties and 
responsibilities of the emergency management specialist position. Those duties and 
responsibilities for the position are listed as follows. 
 Prepare monthly and annual reports, as well as emergency management 
communications on a daily basis for distribution to various departments 
and coordinate activities with state and federal agencies 
 Assist with the development of operational budget 
 Assist in the development of strategic plans 
 Participate in the Hall County disaster management team 
 Investigate and maintain grant programs  
 Assist in the maintenance of hazard mitigation and emergency operation 
plans 
                                                 
109 Hall County Class Specification, Emergency Management Specialist, Job Code 9425, February 
2005. 
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In preparedness and mitigation, HCEMA assists the community by analyzing the 
hazards that may affect the latter, and then developing mitigation strategies and 
emergency operations plans to combat those hazards.110 HCEMA is also responsible for 
getting resources to the areas within its jurisdiction affected by a natural or man-made 
disaster up to and including asking the governor of the State of Georgia to declare a state 
of emergency to receive state resources when needed.111 In the recovery effort, HCEMA 
coordinates clean-up efforts, educates victims about available relief programs, distributes 
disaster relief funds, and provides tools to identify public structures in areas at risk of 
damage.112 HCEMA also maintains and staffs the jurisdiction’s EOC when the need 
arises.  
Relating to security clearances or intelligence within HCEMA, personnel assigned 
to the agency have no clearance to obtain information of a sensitive nature. HCEMA does 
work with a representative from the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
(GISAC); however, that person only receives FOUO information and does not have 
access to any information requiring a clearance.113 Most of the FOUO information 
HCEMA receives is from a threat awareness standpoint. As an example, the agency 
receives information concerning security issues that may include any number of threats 
made from radical groups in the area. Although the agency receives these reports, they 
are “dummied down;” in other words, no detail is made available, such as the who, what, 
when, and where, but only very general information that a threat is possible. 
Most of the threat awareness information HCEMA receives is related to the fire 
services or issues dealing with hazardous materials. The HCSO receives more detailed 
information about threats involving terrorism due to having the proper clearances, but 
                                                 
110 “Emergency Management Agency, Preparedness and Mitigation,” accessed August 2014, 
http://www.hallcounty.org/fireservices/fire_ema.asp. 
111 “Emergency Management Agency, Response,” accessed August 2014, http://www.hallcounty.org/ 
fireservices/fire_ema.asp. 
112 “Emergency Management Agency, Recovery,” accessed August 2014, http://www.hallcounty.org/ 
fireservices/fire_ema.asp. 
113 Kimbrell, in discussion with the author. 
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due to no one in HCEMA having the proper clearances; they are not privy to this 
information that requires a clearance or is of a law enforcement sensitive nature.  
In determining the role of the HCSO relating to homeland security, it was 
ascertained that the HCSO did not have a unit designated only to homeland security 
operations. The commander of the specialized units, such as SWAT, EOD, Search and 
Rescue, Marine Patrol, and crime suppression, handles the duties of terrorism prevention 
and homeland security within the department.114  
The HCSO gathers intelligence on potential threats to Hall County or surrounding 
jurisdictions through bulletins from the JTTF or GISAC. Although HCEMA receives 
information from GISAC as well, the HCSO receives sensitive law enforcement 
information that HCEMA is not cleared to see. This information includes “law 
enforcement sensitive” and also information requiring a security clearance, such as 
possible targets and the reasons terrorists may be interested in these targets.115 Other 
ways information is received is through collaboration with state agencies, such as the 
Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI), the local satellite office of the FBI, reports from 
the general public that may be recorded on a SAR, and tips through the HCSO website 
under the “See Something Say Something” campaign.116 
The HCSO and HCEMA works closely with one another on a daily basis for 
planning purposes. The HCSO and HCEMA consult one another on critical infrastructure 
security plans and collaborate on the jurisdiction’s emergency operations and hazard 
mitigation plans. Much of the intelligence information received is passed along to 
HCEMA unless it is restricted by the label of “law enforcement sensitive” or any other 
restrictions that would limit information sharing.117 The HCSO also works closely with 
the HCFD on hazardous material and CBRNE incidents.  
                                                 
114 Joe Carter (Captain, Hall County Sheriff’s Office), in discussion with the author, August 7, 2014. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
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D. BUDGETARY INFORMATION 
The budget information was obtained from the HCFD budget reports from 2003 
through 2013.118 The overall fire department budget was compared to the total amount of 
funding allocated to emergency management. The amount of federal grant monies was 
also obtained and inspected for significant increases or decreases during the same time 
period. The grant monies examined include both emergency management and homeland 
security grants received by the jurisdiction.  
The overall fire department budget for 2003 was approximately $16,000,000. The 
budget amounts continued to increase through 2008 to approximately $23,000,000. After 
2008, slight declines occurred the following two years of 2009 and 2010 to $22,400,000 
and $21,800,000, respectfully. In the following years through 2013, the budget remained 
fairly steady between $22 million and $23 million.119 
Budgetary funding for emergency management in 2003 and 2004 was just under 
$12,000 and $11,000, respectively. Beginning in 2005, the emergency management 
budget began to increase steadily to a maximum of just over $251,000. In 2009, the 
budget began to decline and lowered to approximately $99,000 in 2013. The only slight 
increase after 2009 was in 2011 when it reached approximately $181,000 from 
approximately $149,000 in 2010.120 (See Figure 5.) 
                                                 
118 Tim Sims (Hall County Purchasing Manager), email message to the author, August 7, 2014. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
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In Millions of Dollars 
Figure 5.  Overall Fire Budget versus EMA/Homeland Security Budget 
The federal grant monies for the year 2003 were much lower than the following 
two years of 2004 and 2005. In 2003, funding was approximately $80,000. In 2004, a 
very large increase to approximately $1.5 and $1.4 million occurred in 2005. After 2005, 
funding decreased substantially, as it dropped to approximately $342,000 and fluctuated 
considerably through 2013.121 (See Figure 6.) 
                                                 
121 Hall County Georgia Schedule of Expenditures of Federal Awards, 2003–2013. 
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In Millions of Dollars 
Figure 6.  EMA/Homeland Security Grant Funding 
E. ANALYSIS 
HCEMA concentrates the majority of its time on the development of plans that 
assist with the preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery from both natural 
disasters and man-made events. The agency does very little in the realm of intelligence or 
investigations of terrorism.  
Through the development of these aforementioned plans, HCEMA does align 
itself with FEMA’s mission and certain missions within the QHSR. By maintaining and 
updating the jurisdiction’s hazard mitigation, the continuity of operations, and the winter 
weather plans, HCEMA does meet the mission objective of protecting life and property 
and reducing the negative impact from natural or man-made disasters.  
The alignment of HCEMA’s mission and operations to the missions of the QHSR 
is lacking in most areas. As to Mission #1 of the QHSR titled, “Prevent Terrorism and 
Enhance Security,” HCEMA is involved in CBRNE and CIKR events, which relate to 
two of the goals under this mission, but at a minimal level. Under the goal referencing 
CBRNE, this organization coordinates the response of the fire department to CBRNE 
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incidents and is responsible for decontamination efforts. HCEMA also anticipates threats 
involving these events by maintaining and keeping up-to-date on its hazard mitigation 
plan and threat assessments. HCEMA does not interdict unlawful acquisition of CBRNE 
materials or prevent its hostile use as is directed in the QHSR. These responsibilities are 
those of the HCSO. HCEMA is also not involved in the investigation and possible 
prevention of such incidents. Not being involved more closely with the investigation and 
prevention efforts causes HCEMA to be lacking in the acquisition of information related 
to these events; therefore, it may be difficult for it to prevent future attacks in these areas.  
Also, under Mission #1, the Emergency Management Homeland Security entity 
has a level of participation in CIKR operations. Participation includes the development of 
redundancy plans by coordinating with the private sector in case of a critical 
infrastructure failure. Also, this entity works closely with law enforcement in conducting 
threat assessments and security planning.  
Mission #2 (Securing and Managing Our Borders) and Mission #3 (Enforcement 
and Administering of Immigration Laws) of the QHSR are not handled by HCEMA, nor 
does it receive any information regarding these missions. This lack of information 
sharing occurs because the HCEMA staff does not possess any type of security clearance. 
Also, due to the Emergency Management Homeland Security entity being all civilian 
with no law enforcement component, it does not participate in securing or managing U.S. 
borders through investigations of illegal immigrants or criminal organizations within its 
jurisdiction, nor does it enforce or become involved in immigration laws.  
The QHSR Mission #4 of securing cyberspace is not directly the responsibility of 
HCEMA. Any information concerning the security or protection of the jurisdiction’s 
computer systems is given to the IT section. This lack of knowledge is a disadvantage to 
HCEMA and makes it difficult to mitigate against these threats. HCEMA is involved 
with providing redundancy plans should the systems fail, but it cannot be certain of what 
threats may exist that could cause these systems to fail.  
Mission #5 of the QHSR titled, “Strengthen National Preparedness and 
Resilience” and the FEMA mission of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery is 
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handled nicely by HCEMA through its planning efforts that include coordination with the 
HCSO, the IT section, and the private sector through critical infrastructure assessments. 
Alignment with this mission is also seen by HCEMA’s participation in a disaster 
management team, the local emergency planning committee, and planning for drills and 
exercises.  
The main emphasis of the Emergency Management Homeland Security entity is 
placed on the development of plans, the coordination needed for the development of these 
plans, and training. This entity develops plans as they relate to mitigating the hazards that 
frequently occur in the jurisdiction based on the history of past incidents. This 
organization also develops continuity of operations plans and ensures each plan includes 
response and recovery initiatives. To complete these plans, strong coordination is 
required between departments within the jurisdiction. This emphasis placed on 
coordination assists with the planning for both natural disasters and acts of terrorism. By 
working closely with law enforcement and other departments, the Emergency 
Management Homeland Security entity strengthens and sustains preparedness. Through 
the development of these plans, this organizational structure meets all of the goals set 
forth in Mission #5 of the QHSR. 
One area in which HCEMA appears lacking is in intelligence and information 
sharing. HCEMA does work with GISAC, but only receives limited information 
regarding threats to the jurisdiction, such as radical groups active in the area, blast email 
bulletins, and information designated FOUO regarding general threat awareness updates. 
Nothing is received as it relates to possible targets located in or around the jurisdiction. 
The inability of the HCEMA staff to obtain security clearances that provide this 
information causes problems when trying to plan for the prevention of certain threats, 
particularly man-made or terrorism. Although HCEMA does work with a representative 
at GISAC, it is not given “law enforcement sensitive” information that could assist with 
developing more complete plans for any threat or hazard. This sensitive information is 
received by the HCSO. No detailed information is received that answers the questions of 
who, what, when, where, and how the threat may be carried out. This hindrance makes it 
difficult to include certain threats in the formulation of plans. The Emergency 
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Management Homeland Security entity and law enforcement do work together on 
occasion for planning purposes, but law enforcement cannot share certain sensitive 
information.  
The annual budgets for both the HCFD and HCEMA remained fairly steady 
during the period observed. The fluctuation in grant monies during the years between 
2003 and 2005 were significant. In 2003, grant expenditures were related to hazard 
mitigation planning. In 2004 and 2005, the increase in funds was used for capital 
expenditures involving equipment for the fire department, emergency medical services, 
and 911 communications. The Emergency Management Homeland Security entity’s 
budget only consists of one department and discipline, which thus allows the budget to be 
simplified because monies do not have to be distributed between two separate 
departments or disciplines.  
Disadvantages of having only one department and discipline involved is limited 
grant funding. Emergency management grants, such as the EMPG, can be utilized in this 
instance, but the limitation comes from restrictions placed on some homeland security 
grants by the federal government; thereby, not allowing for the grants to be used as 
needed for this entity’s goals. Table 5 shows the advantages and disadvantages of the 
HCEMA model. 
Table 5.   Advantages and Disadvantages of the HCEMA Model 
ADVANTAGES 
 Alignment of HCEMA mission statement to FEMA mission statement 
 Alignment with QHSR Mission #5 involving strengthening preparedness and 
resilience 
 Coordination with other entities for planning purposes 
 Budget does not have to be separated between two disciplines  
DISADVANTAGES 
 Minimal alignment with QHSR Mission #1 involving prevention of terrorism and 
enhancing security 
 No alignment with QHSR Mission #2 involving border security 
 No alignment with QHSR Mission #3 involving immigration laws (HCSO handles) 
 Only a minor alignment with QHSR Missions #4 involving cyberspace 
 Lack of information and intelligence sharing 
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The Emergency Management Homeland Security entity is designed for 
jurisdictions that require more emphasis on preparing, mitigating, responding to, and 
recovering from both natural and man-made disasters. This particular structure places less 
prominence on the investigation of terrorism, criminal organizations that could be a part 
of terrorism, or illegal immigration. Due to this structure including a civilian only staff, 
these types of functions cannot be carried out, but instead are handled by law 
enforcement. The next chapter examines an integrated structure that includes both 
emergency management and law enforcement.  
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VI. CASE STUDY C: INTEGRATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT HOMELAND SECURITY 
The integration of homeland security and emergency management is an 
organizational structure that includes both disciplines working together under the same 
leadership. Each may have a different director; however, they are within the same unit, 
division, etc., and have the same goals.  
A. BACKGROUND 
The jurisdiction chosen for this organizational structure is Dekalb County, 
Georgia. Dekalb County is located approximately 15 miles north of the city of Atlanta. 
The population of Dekalb County is just over 700,000 residents.  
Dekalb County public safety falls under a Public Safety Director who answers to 
a Chief Executive Officer and a Board of Commissioners. Both the police chief and the 
fire chief report to the Public Safety Director. (See Figures 7 and 8) The Dekalb County 
Emergency Management Division is supervised by both the Emergency Management 
Director and the Chief of Police. The Emergency Management Division also houses the 
Homeland Security Unit. (See Figure 7) Homeland security is also recognized in the 
Dekalb County Police Department organizational structure under the chief’s office.  
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Figure 7.  Dekalb County Police Department Organizational Chart122 
                                                 
122 J. F. Rich (DeKalb County Police Department Office of Homeland Security/DEMA), email message to the author, May 14, 2014 
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Figure 8.  Dekalb County Fire Rescue Organizational Chart123 
                                                 
123 Rich, email message to the author. 
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A total of 12 employees are assigned to the Emergency Management/Homeland 
Security division, which includes civilian administrative assistants, fire personnel and 
police officers. Of these 12 employees, one is an assistant fire chief who is the director of 
emergency management and the other is the Chief of Police who is the director of 
homeland security. (See Figure 9.) 
 
Figure 9.  Dekalb Emergency Management Organizational Chart124 
B. MISSION  
According to the organizational charts, homeland security is represented under 
both the police department and the emergency management division. This representation 
shows that the police are responsible for homeland security in both areas; however, 
emergency management is not represented under the fire department. This omission 
could cause confusion because the fire chief is responsible for emergency management 
within the county. The fire department not listing emergency management as one of its 
areas of responsibility on the organizational chart could make it difficult to decipher if 
funding within the fire department is allocated toward emergency management. Also, the 
                                                 
124 Rich, email message to the author. 
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organizational charts make it difficult to understand if the emergency management 
division is a division under the police department or the fire department.  
The following sections describe the mission of both the Dekalb Office of 
Homeland Security (DOHS) and the Dekalb Emergency Management Agency (DEMA). 
1. Dekalb Office of Homeland Security 
The mission of the DOHS is stated as follows. 
The Dekalb County Office of Homeland Security is staffed by Dekalb 
police detectives specially trained and equipped to investigate all 
suspicious substances, suspicious packages, bomb threats, suspected 
terrorist activity, lone wolfs, and threats to law enforcement and public 
officials. Additionally, the homeland detectives identify, prioritize and 
conduct assessments on all Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
(CI/KR) in the county as required under (Homeland Security Presidential 
Directives) HSPD-5, 7, & 8 to proactively plan and prepare for possible 
terrorist attacks. The homeland detectives regularly liaise with local, state, 
and federal partners as well as private industry and non-government 
entities to assist in investigations, provide and receive training, and build 
mutual working relationships. The Office of Homeland Security also 
functions to assist the DeKalb Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) 
with activation and operation of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), 
facilitation of the Strategic National Stockpile Plan, the testing, 
maintenance, operation, and deployment of county emergency equipment, 
and provide assistance and leadership for all high impact incidents in the 
county.125 
According to the mission statement of the DOHS, Mission #1 of the QHSR, 
preventing terrorism and enhancing security, is carried out by understanding, deterring, 
and protecting against terrorist attacks. The DOHS demonstrates this prevention and 
enhancement through investigating all suspicious substance and package calls, bomb 
threats, and suspected terrorist activity calls. Adhering to this mission is also shown 
through the analysis of important documents and reports for trends and vulnerabilities by 
investigators in the DOHS. These documents are comprised of reports from the state 
                                                 
125 Dekalb County Office of Homeland Security, Dekalb County Police Department Office of 
Homeland Security Overview (Dekalb, GA: Dekalb County Office of Homeland Security, 2014). 
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fusion center, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Department of Justice 
intelligence bulletins, and FBI situational awareness reports.126  
The DOHS also identifies, prioritizes, and conducts assessments on all critical 
infrastructure and key resources located in the county.127 It correlates to the objective in 
the QHSR that states, “Manage Risks to Critical Infrastructure.” The DOHS complies 
with HSPD-5, HSPD-7, and HSPD-8 to plan and prepare for possible terrorist attacks on 
these facilities.128 
Stopping the spread of violent extremism is also a priority in the DOHS due to its 
investigations of “lone wolf” radicals. The DOHS mission is similar to the goals listed in 
Mission #1 in the QHSR through the prioritization of protecting public officials and 
engaging in community outreach programs, as is shown in its mission statement.  
The DOHS prevents and protects against the use of CBRN, which is a goal listed 
under Mission #1 of the QHSR. The Dekalb County Office of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Management investigates any threat or unauthorized use of these materials 
when the information is acquired through any means of intelligence.129 Also, if an attack 
does occur involving CBRN, the police department’s EOD unit handles the situation 
from an operational standpoint. 
QHSR Mission #2 referring to border security, and Mission #3 referring to 
immigration laws, the DOHS does house ICE agents in its office so it can obtain 
information critical to its jurisdiction in a timely manner.130 Also, regarding Mission #4, 
which refers to cyber security, it is not managed by the DOHS on the local level. This 
particular mission is managed by the jurisdiction’s IT unit and also on the federal level. 
                                                 
126 Archer Company comprehensive position questionnaire, DOHS, May 2014, 5. 
127 Dekalb County Office of Homeland Security, Dekalb County Police Department Office of 
Homeland Security Overview, 1. 2014 
128 Ibid. 
129 Rich, email message to the author. 
130 Ibid. 
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Any information of importance to the DOHS regarding cyber security is issued through 
its representatives assigned to the JTTF or received through the state fusion center.131  
In conforming with Mission #5 in the QHSR, the DOHS ensures the resilience to 
disasters within Dekalb County, and assists the Dekalb Emergency Management Agency 
in a variety of different ways. First, the DOHS assists DEMA in the activation and 
operation of the EOC during times of critical incidents and represents law enforcement 
under the emergency support function (ESF) #13. The DOHS also coordinates the 
county’s WebEOC system, which is an Internet-based incident management software 
program in use by the county. The DOHS ensures emergency equipment used by DEMA 
is operational and functional through testing and maintenance.132 Members of the DOHS 
also participate in the emergency management planning process when needed to include 
the strategic national stockpile (SNS).  
Conforming to Mission #1, Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security and 
Mission #5, Strengthening National Preparedness and Resilience, the DOHS may qualify 
for federal grants needed to sustain these missions within the jurisdiction. Table 6 lists 
the five missions in the 2014 QHSR along with the DOHS compliance.  
Table 6.   Dekalb Office of Homeland Security Compliance with QHSR 
QHSR Missions Does Dekalb County Align with QHSR? 
Mission #1: Prevent terrorism and enhance 
security 
YES 
Mission #2: Secure and manage our borders NO* 
Mission #3: Enforce and administer 
immigration laws 
Partially** 
Mission #4: Safeguard and secure cyberspace NO*** 
Mission #5: Strengthen national preparedness 
and resilience 
YES 
*indicates the mission is managed on federal or state level and information related to jurisdiction is 
received from these entities.  
**DOHS does work with ICE regarding immigration concerns 
***Handled by another agency within the county  
                                                 
131 Rich, email message to the author. 
132 Dekalb County Office of Homeland Security, Dekalb County Police Department Office of 
Homeland Security Overview, 1. 
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2. Dekalb Emergency Management Agency  
The mission of the DEMA is defined as follows. 
The Dekalb County Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) will 
provide countywide emergency management and coordination through 
prevention, protection, and mitigation against natural and man-made 
disasters. Furthermore, DEMA will be a primary responder to acts of 
terrorism and other emergencies that threaten the citizens and the county 
of Dekalb. 
According to information from Dekalb County, 
DEMA coordinates the response of local agencies ensuring the most 
appropriate resources are dispatched to the impacted areas in a time of a 
disaster. Through various programs DEMA works with local governments, 
volunteer organizations and the private sector throughout DeKalb County 
to develop and teach disaster preparedness plans, mitigation activities and 
provide training and exercise evaluations.133 
As can be seen, the mission of DEMA closely mirrors the definition established 
by FEMA. In an effort to prepare and mitigate for both natural and man-made disasters, 
DEMA developed and maintains a hazard mitigation plan for the county. This plan not 
only incorporates hazard considerations, but also considers geographic and demographic 
characteristics, roles, and responsibilities of key partners in local, state, and federal 
government, as well as the private sector.  
The DEMA participates in regional plans that could affect the entire Metro 
Atlanta region. These plans include an evacuation and reentry plan, mass care, volunteer 
management, and a long-term recovery plan. By participating in these plans, the 
coordination aspect of the FEMA mission is recognized.  
C. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES 
1. Dekalb Office of Homeland Security 
The Dekalb Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management does not 
have an official operational procedure manual; therefore, the operational information for 
the Homeland Security Unit was taken from a comprehensive position questionnaire for 
                                                 
133 “About DEMA,” accessed August 2014, http://web.co.dekalb.ga.us/dk_police/pol-dema.html. 
 69
an Office of Homeland Security position in Dekalb County. The questionnaire discusses 
the purpose of the position, which closely resembles the unit’s mission statement. The 
questionnaire then breaks down the specific functions carried out by the position and the 
percentage of time allocated to these functions. Next, the duties and responsibilities are 
listed that are needed to be performed to execute the listed functions. Other items 
included in the questionnaire are lists of reports and documents received and reviewed by 
the DOHS along with those reports and documents prepared by members of the DOHS 
and the purposes for both. Lastly, education and training requirements are listed for a 
typical officer assigned to the DOHS.  
The DOHS has six essential functions. The first of these functions is assessing 
CIKR. This function takes up the majority of the homeland security officer’s job. 
Conducting these assessments includes an initial site visit to gather information in regard 
to policies and procedures about the infrastructure and to speak with key personnel at the 
facility. Research is completed on each site and information concerning historical threats, 
known vulnerabilities, and any exposed knowledge of a critical nature, is collected. A 
tour of the facility is completed to determine critical nodes or places of most importance 
at the facility. A threat assessment is then developed for the site based on this open 
source and FOUO information.  
Function #2 is listed as investigating suspected terrorist activity, such as 
suspicious substances and packages, bomb threats, lone wolf activity, and any threats 
levied toward law enforcement or public officials. When these types of incidents occur, 
investigators respond to the scene if an actual event occurred. These investigators will 
gather on-scene information, interview and interrogate individuals if necessary, provide 
operational support, and work closely with both state and federal partners. Those 
assigned to the Homeland Security Unit will also conduct surveillance, develop and 
follow up on leads, document the facts of the case, and make arrests if a suspect is 
identified.  
Function #3 is described as assisting the emergency management section with the 
activation and operation of the EOC during critical events. A critical event could be any 
terrorist event previously described or any other man-made or natural occurring event. 
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The main duties under this function for the homeland security personnel are to coordinate 
with adjacent county and state agencies as needed and assist local cities located within 
the boundaries of the county. Homeland security personnel will also filter any 
information received through various outlets and report them to the director of emergency 
management and assist the director with any other tasks that may need to be completed.  
Function #4 consists of researching open source and FOUO material regarding 
terrorism intelligence. This information is received from federal fusion centers and other 
daily and weekly intelligence reports. Function #4 is closely related to Function #6 in that 
Function #6 is attending meetings with both state and federal partners to gain information 
and intelligence and then brief other investigators in the homeland security unit. 
Investigators in the DOHS have security clearances, whereas civilians working under 
DEMA do not.  
Function #5 is attending training and instructing various classes. Training for a 
homeland security officer includes specialization in personnel security, gathering and 
analyzing human intelligence (HUMINT), and imagery and geospatial intelligence. 
Certain clearances are also required. 
The close examination of these functions within the DOHS is necessary to be 
compared to the operational responsibilities of the DEMA to see if any duplication of 
services occurs or if funds can be reduced in certain areas.  
2. Dekalb Emergency Management Agency 
DEMA does not list separate functions in its operational concept. Instead, the 
overview of the agency lists several operational responsibilities of emergency 
management. The operational responsibilities of DEMA include the following. 
 Maintaining and developing all local emergency management programs, 
projects, and plans required by state and federal government 
 Maintaining the EOC for DeKalb County and other municipalities located 
inside the jurisdiction of Dekalb 
 Act as a liaison with local, state, and federal authorities during major 
emergencies and disasters 
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 Provide 24-hour coordination of resources for emergencies and 
disasters134 
One obvious responsibility is to maintain and activate the EOC and ensure it 
functions properly when needed.135 As stated previously, DEMA prepares and mitigates 
for natural and man-made disasters including terrorism through the development of 
numerous plans geared toward these objectives.  
If at any point in time the SNS is needed, DEMA facilitates points of distribution 
(PODs) along with the board of health. DEMA also works with the DOHS in planning for 
and activating the SNS system and protocols.136  
In the case of a disaster affecting Dekalb County government, DEMA developed 
and maintains a continuity of operations plan (COOP).137 A COOP plan is used to 
establish policy and guidance to ensure the essential functions of the government are 
carried out in case a disaster, either natural or man-made, causes daily operations to be 
threatened.  
D. BUDGETARY INFORMATION 
The budget information was taken from the Dekalb County budget reports for the 
years 2002 through 2013.138 The overall police and homeland security budgets were 
compared to see the percentage of funding allocated toward homeland security. A 
separate emergency management budget was not reported in either the police or fire 
budgets; therefore, a similar comparison could not be performed for emergency 
management.  
The overall police and fire budget in 2002 was approximately $131 million with 
no funding allocated to homeland security due to the unit being created later that year. In 
                                                 
134 “Responsibilities,” accessed August 2014, http://web.co.dekalb.ga.us/dk_police/pol-dema.html.  
135 Dekalb County Office of Homeland Security, Dekalb County Police Department Office of 
Homeland Security Overview, 3. 
136 Ibid., 4. 
137 Ibid. 
138 “Dekalb County Budget Information,” accessed July 2014, http://www.dekalbcountyga.gov/ 
finance/fin_budget.html.  
 72
2003, the first full year of the unit’s existence, approximately $890,000 was allocated 
toward homeland security funding. As the years progressed, the overall police/fire budget 
steadily increased to a maximum of approximately $200 million in 2009. The homeland 
security budget followed the same path of steadily increasing to almost $3 million in 
2009. After 2009, the overall police/fire budget began a continuous decrease to just over 
$156 million in 2013. The only exception was in 2011 when the budget remained about 
the same. Again, the homeland security unit followed suit and decreased to just over 
$886,000 in 2013. (See Figure 10)  
 
Figure 10.  Dekalb Overall Police/Fire Budget versus Homeland Security 
Budget  
Some of the budget reduction for the Homeland Security Unit was replenished 
with grant funds. The major grant funds utilized were the HSPG, the UASI grant, and the 
EMPG. According to the Dekalb County budget reports, the years of 2004–2013, with the 
exception of 2007, were the only years subsidized with a homeland security or 
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emergency management grant. Figure 11 shows a breakdown of the total amounts of 
grant monies by year.  
 
Figure 11.  Dekalb Homeland Security Grant Funding 
E. ANALYSIS 
The integrated Law Enforcement and Emergency Management Homeland 
Security involves itself in aspects of both law enforcement and emergency management. 
The combination of the two disciplines allows two mission statements; one for each 
discipline. Since both entities work under the same organizational structure, the 
concentration of the operations can include preparing, mitigating, responding, and 
recovering from natural disasters, man-made disasters, and terrorism under the same 
organization. Due to each discipline having a close working relationship with the other, 
improvement in planning for both terrorism and natural disasters does occur. It is also 
possible to cross train personnel in certain aspects of each discipline. As an example, the 
law enforcement side is familiar with EOC protocol, planning for critical health concerns 
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that involve the strategic national stockpile, and the capability to operate software used 
within the emergency management realm. The emergency management side has a better 
understanding of crime scene integrity and other aspects  important to law enforcement 
when it comes to planning for man-made incidents. This single entity cannot only 
develop plans, but it can also conduct investigations and thwart terrorism activities 
through enforcement.  
The missions of the DOHS closely correlate to those listed in the QHSR. Goals 
listed under Mission #1 are satisfied due to the DOHS attempting to prevent terrorist 
attacks through the analysis of intelligence documents received through the JTTF, the 
state fusion center, or from internally generated intelligence documents. The DOHS 
deters and disrupts terrorism operations by investigating all suspected terrorist activity, 
such as suspicious packages and substances, violent extremism (lone wolfs) and bomb 
threats. The DOHS meets another goal under Mission #1 by reducing risk to critical 
infrastructure through conducting assessments on these facilities. One goal under Mission 
#1 not expressed in the mission statement for the DOHS is preventing and protecting 
against CBRN. Although this activity is not listed, these events are investigated by the 
Homeland Security Unit. CBRN should be added to the mission statement of the DOHS 
to show its compliance with this part of Mission #1.  
Mission #1 also includes the goal of protecting critical infrastructure. The DOHS 
devotes a significant amount of time to this responsibility, which also carries over into 
the fourth mission of the QHSR, safeguarding and securing cyberspace. An advantage of 
the DOHS conducting critical infrastructure assessments is that it can complete two goals 
within two different missions of the QHSR. These goals are strengthening the security 
and resilience of critical infrastructure in Mission #4 and also reducing the risk to critical 
infrastructure, which is a goal under Mission #1.  
QHSR Missions #2 (border security) and # 3 (immigration laws) are not directly 
handled by the DOHS; however, information is received through the JTTF or the state 
fusion center if applicable to the jurisdiction. Securing and managing the borders, along 
with investigating immigration laws, although important, is not focused on by the DOHS, 
but is instead handled by ICE agents who are on loan and work inside the DOHS. It is an 
 75
advantage to this type of organizational structure because this coordinated effort is made 
possible due to the law enforcement element in place.  
In one area under Mission #4 of the QHSR (safeguard and secure cyberspace) the 
DOHS does not have the responsibility of securing its government’s IT enterprise. This 
task is left up to the jurisdiction’s IT department; however, if a breach occurs, then 
DOHS investigators would conduct the criminal investigation. This procedure could be 
considered a duplication of services being that tasks associated with IT security are 
handled in two different areas. A representative from IT should be included in the DOHS.  
Mission #5 (strengthening preparedness and resilience) is a joint effort between 
both the DOHS and DEMA. The DOHS assists DEMA in the preparation of emergency 
plans, such as delivery of the strategic national stockpile, and with the coordination of 
WebEOC, an emergency management communication system. An advantage of this 
organizational structure is the close working relationship between the DOHS and DEMA 
for the purposes of planning for both natural disasters and man-made or terrorist events. 
The emergency management section conducts missions listed in its mission statement 
that closely resembles FEMA’s missions. These missions include preparedness, 
mitigation, response, and recovery. This section also contributes to regional plans that 
include evacuation and reentry, mass care, volunteer management, and long-term 
recovery.  
An additional advantage to this particular entity includes the availability of more 
manpower since the employees include police officers, firefighters, and civilians, and 
therefore, do not have to rely on only one department for staffing needs. When looking at 
the organizational charts for this organization, personnel from both the police department 
and the fire department are utilized. The police department handles the law enforcement 
aspect, as it relates to crime and terrorism and also assists the emergency management 
section with planning, etc. The emergency management section maintains and develops 
all local preparedness programs and the development and maintenance of all projects and 
plans required by state and federal government. The integration of both law enforcement 
and emergency management allows each entity to work together under the same roof; 
therefore, the problem of each performing the same tasks to develop a plan or apply for 
 76
grant funding is reduced. Administrative services are also consolidated because each 
discipline uses the same asset instead of several individuals completing the same tasks for 
each discipline separately. No evidence of duplication of services is apparent with the 
integrated structure.  
Although the integrated structure does have advantages, a disadvantage is 
confusion in the chain of command due to positions falling under three organizational 
charts. This particular organization deals with three separate organizational charts 
because personnel are assigned from the police department, the fire department, and then 
personnel from each are incorporated under the combined law enforcement/emergency 
management homeland security entity. The director of emergency management is a fire 
chief; however, the fire department organizational chart does not list this chief as holding 
this position. The police department organizational chart shows homeland security under 
the office of the police chief. The emergency management division organizational chart 
also shows homeland security under the chief of police.  
Most of this confusion could be rectified by rewriting the organizational chart for 
the integrated entity; however, at times, depending on the type of incident, conflicts could 
exist between the law enforcement and emergency management sides. A solution to this 
problem could be to develop guidelines in advance for the command structure depending 
on the type of incident. For example, if the incident is a natural disaster, then the 
emergency management side, which includes the fire department, would take the lead. If 
the incident resulted from a criminal or terrorist incident, then the law enforcement side 
would have command.  
Another disadvantage to this structure is that the emergency management section 
has limited access to critical information. Although both emergency management and law 
enforcement are integrated, law enforcement can receive certain sensitive information 
that emergency management personnel cannot. Again, as has been discussed in the 
emergency management homeland security entity chapter, the sharing of critical 
information or intelligence is important from both a planning and operational standpoint. 
If certain information is only made known to emergency management personnel during 
an exigent circumstance, time would not allow for proper preparation or mitigation. This 
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problem could be avoided if information was allowed to flow freely between the two 
disciplines at all times.  
An analysis of the overall police budget and the homeland security budget for the 
years available show a steady increase in both from 2002 through 2009. Extensive 
funding was also obtained from homeland security grants from 2008 and 2011. The 
amount of funding allotted for public safety and homeland security shows that it does not 
appear that budget constraints would jeopardize the homeland security unit. No separate 
budget is reported for emergency management within the jurisdiction. All funds for the 
DOHS and DEMA are listed under homeland security, which makes it difficult to 
decipher the amounts going into emergency management.  
After 2008, funding in both the overall police/fire budget and the homeland 
security budget began to decline significantly. The 2009 budget report stated that funding 
for the foreseeable future would be challenged to provide an expected level of public 
safety services given the pressures on revenues exerted by generally poor economic 
conditions.139 Grant funding in homeland security also decreased after 2009.  
A budgetary advantage to the integrated structure involves the ability to apply for 
grants under both homeland security and emergency management. Due to grant guidance, 
some grants are only able to be used under certain circumstances and for certain 
equipment. For instance, a grant tied to emergency management issues may allow for the 
purchase of a water tender, but not for an armored vehicle. Through the integration of 
both disciplines, both emergency management grants and homeland security grants can 
be used to allow for more diversity to fit the needs of the jurisdiction better.  
The importance of grant funding is shown when the DOHS downsized from 
approximately 20 investigators to five including the deputy director in 2009. Instead of 
completely dissolving the DOHS, the jurisdiction elected to continue the unit to have a 
police presence with DEMA and to continue to qualify for homeland security grants.  
                                                 
139 “Dekalb County Georgia 2009 Annual Budget,” 2009, http://www.co.dekalb.ga.us/finance/pdf/ 
budget/2009/DeKalb_2009_Budget_Book.pdf.  
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Table 7 lists both the advantages and disadvantages of the integrated law 
enforcement and emergency management homeland security entity. 
Table 7.   Advantages and Disadvantages of the Integrated Law Enforcement 
and Emergency Management Homeland Security Entity 
ADVANTAGES 
 Missions correlate to the QHSR and those of FEMA 
 No significant duplication of services 
 More manpower available due to the integration of law enforcement and 
emergency management 
 Ability to share grant monies 
 Ability to prepare, mitigate, respond, and recover from all hazards including 
natural, man-made, and terrorism disasters under the same entity 
DISADVANTAGES 
 Confusing organizational charts 
 DEMA has no security clearance 
 A separate budget not listed for emergency management under the fire department
 
The integrated law enforcement/emergency management homeland security entity 
should be considered in jurisdictions that place an equal amount of emphasis on terrorism 
and natural disasters. The integrated entity should also be considered only if a good 
relationship exists between law enforcement, fire and emergency management personnel. 
Working together under the same entity would require each discipline to respect one 
another and understand the tasks that each must accomplish. The final chapter of this 
thesis include recommendations that should be implemented for each entity previously 
discussed along with concluding statements.  
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis has reviewed three organizational structures used in the Metro Atlanta 
area that illustrated differing approaches to homeland security. The objective was to 
illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of each structure. Based on the case study 
research method, the focus was on the organizational mission, the operational 
characteristics, and budget considerations of each organizational structure. The ensuing 
sections summarize each structure followed by recommendations. 
A. ALIGNMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL MISSION TO THE FEDERAL 
MISSION  
The missions of each organization were compared to the QHSR and the mission 
of FEMA if applicable. The daily operations and goals of the organization are influenced 
by the mission selected. The mission of each organization could also influence the type of 
grant funding that could be utilized to carry out its mission. Each organizational structure 
studied complied to some extent with the federal missions, but each was lacking in some 
areas.  
The law enforcement homeland security entity aligned itself more to the 
intelligence and cyber security missions of the QHSR in the prevention of terrorism, but 
fell short in the mission of preparing for natural disasters or all hazards.  
The emergency management homeland security entity was strong in its alignment 
with the FEMA mission, but with the exception of strengthening preparedness and 
resilience to natural disasters, this entity did not align closely with the missions of the 
QHSR.  
The law enforcement/emergency management entity captured the missions of 
both FEMA and the QHSR better than either of the other organizational structures 
because it incorporates both disciplines into one entity; therefore, the mission can include 
the prevention of terrorism, and prepare and mitigate for natural disasters and other man-
made incidents.  
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1. Operational Characteristics 
Although each organizational structure possesses similarities in operational 
characteristics, each structure chose a different area to emphasize. The law enforcement 
homeland security entity chose to emphasize terrorism through intelligence gathering and 
investigations, which is very different from the emergency management homeland 
security entity, but does have similarities to the law enforcement/emergency management 
homeland security entity.  
The emergency management homeland security entity operates on the basis of 
planning and preparing for natural or man-made disasters. It does work with a local law 
enforcement organization for planning purposes, but does not have the ability to gather or 
be privy to certain intelligence or investigate possible terrorist activity.  
The organizational structure of law enforcement/emergency management 
homeland security listed duties, responsibilities, and functions in both terrorism and all 
hazards including natural disasters and man-made incidents. This particular entity can 
therefore participate in all areas of emergency management and law enforcement since 
each discipline has representatives within one organizational structure.  
2. Budget Considerations 
All three organizations continued to fund their homeland security entities despite 
economic downturns. Although the dollar amounts allocated to homeland security may 
have been reduced due to budgeting constraints, the continued funding of the discipline at 
some level shows its importance to each organization.  
A consideration for each jurisdiction is the ability to fund a homeland security 
entity continually on the local level. The budget information for each organizational 
structure showed that none relied on grant funding to continue to fund its respective 
homeland security entities. Some did, however, use grant funding to purchase equipment 
and supplement other services, but nothing showed positions that relied on grant funding 
or any other means that would require grant funding to continue homeland security 
operations.  
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Grant funding is limited to certain mandates placed on the jurisdiction by the 
federal government. One mandate that affects this study is the ability to apply for certain 
homeland security or emergency management grants. As an example, the law 
enforcement homeland security entity is not able to apply for certain grants pertaining 
only to emergency management and the emergency management homeland security 
entity cannot participate in some grants designated for law enforcement. The integrated 
law enforcement/emergency management homeland security entity is represented by both 
disciplines; therefore, it can partake in grants that the other entities cannot.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Each of the homeland security entities studied in this thesis showed disadvantages 
that could be improved upon. All entities, regardless of its organization structure, are not 
without their problems. The following recommendations are in response to the 
disadvantages found for all three entities studied to improve their efficiency and 
operational capabilities.  
1. Provide Experts for All Five Missions of the QHSR As Part of 
Homeland Security Personnel 
Each homeland security entity should include as part of its personnel, experts in 
each of the areas listed under the missions set forth by the QHSR and the mission 
statement under FEMA. These areas include CBRNE, CIKR, cyber security, border 
security, immigration, and the ability to plan for and mitigate for natural or man-made 
events and terrorism. As was seen in the case studies, the law enforcement entity did not 
include natural disasters, but relied on a separate emergency management entity to 
manage this area. The emergency management entity placed a high concentration on 
planning and response, but did not have the ability to prevent acts of terrorism from an 
enforcement or investigative perspective. As both law enforcement and emergency 
management were placed together in the integrated entity, it can perform most of these 
tasks.  
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2. Improve Information Sharing 
Regarding information sharing, the law enforcement homeland security entity and 
the integrated emergency management/law enforcement homeland security entity have 
the ability to receive most types of intelligence information due to personnel within these 
organizations having some level of security clearance. All three entities work with the 
state fusion center; however, the emergency management homeland security entity is at a 
disadvantage due to its inability to acquire sensitive information. Emergency 
management practitioners, although civilian in the three organizations studied, should 
have the same clearances as law enforcement due to the nature of their duties. Being 
provided with the most up-to-date information for planning and mitigation purposes 
would benefit local jurisdictions by permitting these practitioners to have a greater 
understanding of the threats for which they are planning. This recommendation would 
also allow for a closer working relationship between law enforcement and emergency 
management by having different perspectives on how to best handle a situation or threat 
whether it is a natural, man-made, or a terrorist event. Each discipline can offer many 
advantages, but combining the knowledge of each by improving information sharing, 
would provide more alternatives.  
3. Closer Relationships between Local, State, and Federal Authorities 
Each jurisdiction should have personnel representing its organization assigned to 
both the JTTF and the state fusion center. These representatives should obtain applicable 
information and intelligence related to the prevention and investigation of terrorist 
activity and report to their respective jurisdiction on a scheduled time frame without 
having to go through a third party. In this scenario, pertinent questions can be asked by 
the jurisdictions that cannot be asked if the only form of information sharing is through 
bulletins or blast emails. A closer relationship developed by daily contact could enhance 
trust among all levels of government. 
It is also important to note that information sharing is a two-way street. Local 
jurisdictions depend on assets like the JTTF, state fusion centers, and other local, state, 
and federal organizations to provide the information and intelligence needed to prepare, 
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and possibly, prevent certain actions from occurring. This statement is also true in 
reverse. State and federal organizations depend on the local jurisdictions for intimate 
knowledge of possible threats in their respective areas. By developing closer 
relationships, this two-way information sharing would be enhanced.  
4. Improve Protection for Cyber Infrastructure 
Improvement in the area of cyber protection is needed by all organizational 
structures studied. The law enforcement homeland security entity does have a section 
dedicated to the investigation and enforcement of cyber crimes, but lacks the expertise for 
the actual protection of the infrastructure itself as it relates to a cyber attack involving a 
virus, etc.  
The emergency management homeland security entity does not conduct 
investigations or receive intelligence related to cyber crime or the possibility of a cyber 
attack. This entity does, however, plan for such contingencies by preparing redundancy 
plans with outside agencies within its jurisdiction. The protection of the cyber 
infrastructure is carried out by a separate information and technology unit within another 
part of the local government within that jurisdiction.  
The integrated law enforcement/emergency management homeland security entity 
does not manage the protection of critical infrastructure, but instead, like the other two 
entities, relies on the jurisdiction’s information and technology unit to be familiar with 
the avenues of protection for the cyber infrastructure hardware. This entity also does not 
dedicate personnel to the investigation or intelligence aspect of cyber security, but 
receives its information pertaining to this subject through the Joint Terrorism Task Force 
or the state fusion center.  
Each homeland security entity, regardless of the specific structure chosen, should 
have the ability to receive first-hand intelligence on cyber security and conduct 
investigations on all cyber-related crimes. Each entity should also have personnel 
assigned with the knowledge of all facets of the cyber infrastructure and the ability to 
present ways of protecting the same. 
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5. Development of a Mission Statement 
In regard to homeland security and emergency management, an established 
federal mission is already in place with the QHSR and FEMA. By maintaining similar 
goals, the jurisdiction will meet most mandates that would be required to receive federal 
grant funding. The operations and responsibilities should be closely related to the mission 
statement chosen so that no confusion occurs as to what the organization is to 
accomplish.  
C. LIMITATIONS AND NEED FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research was limited in that it chose to only include homeland security 
structures found in and around the Metro Atlanta area. It is possible other structures may 
be present in other areas of the country that could provide additional advantages or 
options for a homeland security entity.  
Although many aspects of the three organizational structures were shown, this 
thesis concentrated on the advantages and disadvantages of each in regard to the chosen 
mission, the operational aspects, and budget cycle for each structure. In choosing the best 
structure for a particular jurisdiction, other factors could still influence this decision, such 
as the expense of taking on a homeland security entity, the local history of the jurisdiction 
as it relates to probable threats, and the political atmosphere. These areas are 
considerations for future research and are expanded upon as follows.  
The expense of taking on a local homeland security entity is a concern for any 
jurisdiction. Many local jurisdictions utilize state and federal grants to assist with these 
expenses. Although these grants assist with the costs of equipment and operations, 
arguments arise as to whether spending money on homeland security is worth the cost. In 
other words, do the costs outweigh the benefits? A cost benefit analysis would be a good 
avenue of approach to determine if it is feasible for a jurisdiction to begin or continue a 
homeland security entity. It is reasonable not to implement security measures, such as a 
homeland security entity, not because it would not be beneficial, but because the costs are 
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too high.140 The benefit of having a local entity is not possible for all jurisdictions; 
therefore, they may have to rely on other avenues of obtaining information, such as 
neighboring jurisdictions, a state fusion center, or federal authorities. Although this 
reliance on other jurisdictions would not be the best choice due to having to accept what 
they believe works best for them, it is still a level of obtaining information related to 
homeland security.  
The history and types of threats along with the severity and probability of 
occurrence are considerations for the type of organizational structure a jurisdiction should 
implement. Many jurisdictions formulate hazard mitigation plans that include 
probabilities of certain threats based on historical data. Many factors can play a role in 
the types of threats a jurisdiction may encounter. Some of these factors include the 
geographical size of the jurisdiction, the population, important or well-known landmarks, 
critical infrastructure, types of weather, or natural disasters previously encountered, etc. 
If the plan shows a higher probability of terrorism or natural disasters, the jurisdiction 
may elect to choose the law enforcement homeland security entity or the emergency 
management homeland security entity, respectively. If the threats of both are equal, then 
the integrated law enforcement/emergency management homeland security entity may be 
the best choice. It is also important to understand that the probability of occurrence 
should not be the only consideration. The potential damage to infrastructure and the 
potential loss of life within the jurisdiction is a significant factor as well.  
The political landscape is also of importance when determining the best course to 
take regarding a jurisdiction’s organizational structure. It has been shown through 
research that some politicians strongly favor a homeland security entity whereas others 
feel it is a waste of funding. Death due to a terrorist attack or a natural disaster is quite 
low when compared to other risks of accidental death.141 This statement may influence 
the decision of local politicians not to fund a separate homeland security entity. Another 
factor that can influence the opinion of political leaders is public perception. Where the 
                                                 
140 De Rugy, “What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?” 3–4. 
141 W. Kip Viscusi, “Valuing Risks of Death from Terrorism and Natural Disasters,” Journal of Risk 
and Uncertainty 38, no. 3 (2009): 191.  
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politician’s constituents feel homeland security is a vital role in which their local 
government should participate, they could put pressure on them to fund such an entity. 
Also, interagency politics between certain departments in the jurisdiction could influence 
the organizational structure chosen. For example, if a good working relationship does not 
exist between law enforcement, fire, or emergency management, the integrated law 
enforcement/emergency management structure would not be the best option.  
D. CONCLUSION 
After the attacks of 9/11, many local jurisdictions followed the lead of the federal 
government and made the decision to create a homeland security entity. Due to the 
reduction in the amount of homeland security funding both locally and through federal 
grants, local jurisdictions needed to find the most appropriate organizational structure that 
would allow them to save money and still complete the tasks associated with homeland 
security and all that it entails. The many definitions and missions relating to homeland 
security was also a concern when trying to discern what the objective of the local entity 
should be. Should the mission be related to terrorism only or should it be all hazards 
involving natural disasters as well?  
It is clear through current world events, as well as domestic events, that the threat 
of terrorism within the United States is increasing. A major concern is the lone wolf or 
self-radicalizing individuals or groups that form or live in local communities. Due to the 
fact that local law enforcement is familiar with their particular areas, and the persons 
living within their jurisdiction, makes them a great tool for terrorism prevention. Having 
the ability to combat terrorism through an organization with many resources dedicated to 
that purpose shows the importance of having a local homeland security entity. Natural 
disasters have also reeked havoc on local communities and will continue to do so. An 
organization that has the experience and knowledge to best prepare communities for these 
events is also a benefit to having a form of homeland security and emergency 
management on a local level.  
This thesis shows not only the advantages and disadvantages of each entity, but it 
also gives law enforcement and emergency management leaders, elected officials, and 
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other decision makers a basis for better understanding each organizational structure and 
the ability to compare that to what would be needed in their own jurisdiction. By seeing 
the differences, such as one entity having a concentration on intelligence and terrorism, 
whereas another concentrates on natural disasters, leaders can better understand the 
drawbacks and challenges of each structure so they can decipher how they want their 
particular organization to operate. Also, an understanding of these differences allows 
leaders to formulate an organizational structure through the inclusion of what they like 
and reject what they do not to design a structure that works best for them.  
In today’s volatile world, it is imperative that the leadership within local 
jurisdictions understand not only the importance of having a homeland security entity, 
but also recognize the needs of their community and tailor their specific organizational 
structure to fit those needs. The prevention of terrorism-related events or the mitigation of 
natural disasters begins at home. Without a proper homeland security organizational 
structure in place that includes a defined mission specific to the jurisdiction, operations 
that meet the goals of that mission and a budget that allows for these objectives, it is 
almost impossible for a local jurisdiction to plan for, and possibly prevent, such acts from 
occurring, which leaves the local jurisdiction in a very vulnerable position.  
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